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[Ilt is probable that a greater number of monuments of the skill and
industry of man will, in the course of ages, be collected together in
the bed ofthe qcean, than will be seen at one time on the surface of
the continents.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ocean has played an important role in the history of hu-
manity. The sea and its plethora of creatures have supplied not
only a stable food supply, they also have been a source of inspira-
tion, stimulating artistic motifs2 and epics. 3 In addition, boats have
been used for other than just functional purposes, and have been
employed in both celebratory and funerary contexts.4 Currently,
t Mr. McQuown has received a B.A. in Classical Civilization from UCLA, a
M.A. in Archaeological Studies from Yale University, and a J.D. from Vanderbilt
University.
1. 2 CHARLES LYELL, PRINCIPLES OF GEOLOGY 258 (photo. reprint Univ. Chi-
cago Press ed. 1991) (1832).
2. See, e.g., Philip P. Betancourt, Marine-Life Pottery From the Aegean, 30
ARCHAEOLOGY 38, 40-43 (1977) (describing Bronze Age Cretan pottery decorated
with marine-life imagery).
3. One of the more famous epics in which the sea plays a pivotal role is the
Odyssey, which is the tale of Odysseus's return home after the Trojan War. See gen-
erally HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Vintage Classics 1990).
4. For example, the Egyptian pharaoh Khufu was buried with two funerary
boats. See Farouk El-Baz, Finding a Pharaoh's Funeral Bark, 173 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
512, 514 (1988). However these funerary boats were used, "[t]hey were built to
1
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the ocean is the last great bastion protecting submerged relics of
the past from the ravages of time and vandals.5 Wherever found,
archaeological resources are a part of our common cultural heri-
tage. 7 The sea has preserved much of our material past. However,
carry a king who aspired to become part of the heavens." Peter Miller, Riddle of the
Pyramid Boats, 173 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 534, 550 (1988).
5. See generally William L. Rathje, Art Salvaged from the Sea, 1 ARCHAEOLOGY
179 (1948) (discussing some of the art recovered from ancient Mediterranean
shipwrecks). It has been estimated that there are over 50,000 shipwrecks within
the navigable waters of the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 100-514, pt. 1, at 1
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 365; H.R. REP. No. 100-514, pt. 2, at 2
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 370. The number of shipwrecks within the
United States' waters, and the number of archaeological artifacts therefore discov-
erable, are fewer than those in the waters of other parts of the world, where seafar-
ing has been occurring for a longer period of time. For example, Arvid Pardo,
permanent representative of Malta, stated at the United Nations General Assembly
that "I have seen an apparently authoritative statement to the effect that there
would appear to be more objects of archaeological interest lying on the bottom of
the Mediterranean than exist in the museums of Greece, Italy, France and Spain
combined." U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1515 mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515
(1967).
6. Archaeological resources are a subset of "cultural property."
Cultural property encompasses a variety of objects in many different
sizes, shapes, and forms. For example, it may be baskets, pottery, masks,
tapestries, sculptures, or engravings. There is no universally accepted
definition. ... Generally, it is anything exhibiting physical attributes as-
sumed to be the result of human activity.
Antonia M. De Meo, More Effective Protection for Native American Cultural Property
through Regulation of Export, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1994) (citations omitted).
Cultural property may, for instance, encompass shipwrecks, ruins, historic struc-
tures, religious objects, and contemporary objects made by native peoples. See
Stephanie 0. Forbes, Comment, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Pro-
tect Cultural Property, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 235, 23940 (1996); see also Unidroit Conven-
tion on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (June 24, 1995), in LYNDEL V.
PRorr, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION, at 2 (1997) [hereinafter
Unidroit Convention] (stating that cultural objects are those which are of impor-
tance for archaeology, prehistory, science, history, art, or literature, and which be-
long to one of the numerous categories listed in the annex to the Convention).
7. See Richard A. Gould, Getting off the Gold Standard, in UNDERWATER
ARCHAEOLOGY: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE ON UNDERWATER
ARCHAEOLOGY 1, 1 (Calvin R. Cummings ed., 1986). Therefore, "the same scien-
tific, legal, and ethical standards that apply to archaeology on land should also ap-
ply to archaeology under water." Statement by Seminar Participants on the Present Loot-
ing of Shipwrecks in Florida and Texas, in SHIPWRECK ANTHROPOLOGY xiii, xiii
(Richard A. Gould ed., 1983). Different nations view cultural property as belong-
ing either to mankind as a whole, or as being only those nations' national heri-
tage. See generallyJohn Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Prop-
erty, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 831-32 (1986) (discussing the different ways nations
think about cultural property); Anneliese Monden & Geert Wils, Art Objects as
[Vol. 26:2
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with the emergence of modern technology, submerged archaeo-
logical sites" and the artifacts they contain are subject to potential
looting and vandalism.
This article suggests that submerged archaeological resources,
wherever found, should not be governed by admiralty law and sub-
ject to treasure salvage.9 Admiralty laws regarding the ownership
and disposition of salvaged property developed in a context far re-
moved from archaeological resource preservation. As will be
shown, admiralty law sought to achieve a judicial balance between
claims of owners of property lost at sea and the discoverers of such
property. 10 The solution was to allow the finders an award for their
successful efforts in saving some of the lost property." In other in-
stances, where no owner could be found, admiralty law afforded
the finder title to the res.' Thus, admiralty law was primarily con-
Common Heritage of Mankind, 19 REVUE BELGE DE Dsorr INT'L 327 (1986) (same).
8. The development of diving technology is discussed in 50 Years of Scuba,
SKIN DIvER, Feb. 1993, at 7. For a discussion of the tools archaeologists currently
use to find shipwrecks, see generally Roderick Mather, Technology and the Search for
Shipwrecks, 30J. MAR. L. & CoM. 175 (1999). There are numerous types of sub-
merged archaeological sites including "refuse sites," which are merely the under-
water accumulation of refuse, usually near a camp site or ceremonial center, and
.sacred places," which include lakes or springs which local inhabitants believe have
sacred properties and thus deposit offerings in them. SeeJohn M. Goggin, Under-
water Archaeology: Its Nature and Limitations, 25 AM. ANTIQUITY 348, 351-52 (1960).
In addition, there are sundry "drowned habitation sites" off the North American
coast. See generally Melanie J. Stright, Archaeological Sites on the North American Conti-
nental Shelf, in ARCHAEOLOGICAL GEOLOGY OF NORTH AMERIcA 439 (Norman P.
Lasca & Jack Donahue eds., 1990) (discussing 35 sites located on the North
American continental shelf). These are pre-historic sites that became submerged
with the world-wide Post-Pleistocene rise in sea-level. See, e.g., Jon M. Erlandson &
Madonna L. Moss, The Pleistocene-Holocene Transition Along the Pacific Coast of North
America, in HUMANs AT THE END OF THE IcE AGE: THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE
PLEISTOCENE-HOLOCENE TRANSrION 277, 279 (Lawrence Guy Straus et al. eds.,
1996). It is, of course, shipwreck archaeological sites that have most often sparked
the imagination of the public and which will be the focus of this article.
9. Treasure salvors are "those people who derive their primary source of in-
come from forming limited partnerships for the purpose of recovering abandoned
shipwrecks for profit." Anne G. Giesecke, Historic Shipwreck Resources & State
Law: A Developmental Perspective 64 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The
Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.)) (on file with The Catholic
University of America Library) [hereinafter Giesecke, Historic Shipwreck Resources].
For an insightful discussion of the legal preparation that goes into treasure salvage
expeditions, see generally Edward W. Horan, Organizing, Manning and Financing a
Treasure Salvage Expedition, 30J. MAR. L. & COM. 235, 235-38 (1999).
10. For a detailed discussion of admiralty law in the context of determining
the ownership and disposition of historic shipwrecks, see infra Part II.
11. See infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
20001
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cerned with the return of goods lost at sea to the stream of com-
merce. Antithetical to this purpose is that of archaeological re-
source preservation, which stresses the protection of historically
and scientifically significant goods and their eventual scientific ex-S 13
cavation. Like all things, ships and their goods can eventually pass
out of the stream of commerce and into the historical and archaeo-
logical realm.
14
This article concerns the inequity of treasure salvage, a topic
that has consumed much of the field of cultural resource preserva-
tion for many decades. However, there is as yet no comprehensive
domestic or international solution as to how to deal with artifacts,
historic ships and other archaeological sites discovered beneath the
waves. 5  Unfortunately, many proposed "solutions" have allowed
treasure salvors to continue exploiting the past. 16 We can either
protect submerged archaeological resources for all of humanity to
learn from and enjoy or allow a small group of treasure hunters to
exploit historically significant artifacts for their personal gain, de-
stroying much important scientific data in their wake. It is the
proposition of this article that treasure hunters be restrained in
their activities, and that jurists acknowledge the particular signifi-
cance submerged archaeological resources play in an understand-
ing of the past. In order to accomplish these goals, judges must
abandon traditional admiralty law and treat submerged archaeo-
logical resources as a special category of property deserving of pro-
tection under new legal theories or, preferably, domestic and in-
ternational law. In addition, people must be educated regarding
the importance of cultural property. The basic reason underpin-
ning why society must protect and scientifically study these re-
sources is because they are fundamental to an adequate under-
standing of a common human culture and past.17
13. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing why professionally
controlled excavations are necessary for the conservation of archaeological re-
sources and the preservation of scientifically important data).
14. See infra note 131 (giving an example of how something moves out of the
world of commerce and becomes an archaeological site or artifact).
15. See infra notes 63-68 (discussing the domestic Abandoned Shipwreck Act
and noting that there is as yet no comprehensive international law covering un-
derwater archaeological resources).
16. For example, see infra note 102 (discussing a bill that lost to the current
Abandoned Shipwreck Act).
17. Lack of knowledge has led to many misunderstandings and gaps in our
knowledge. For example, scholars know that the Mayans possessed many codices
prior to the codices being destroyed by the Spanish. See generally MICHAEL D. COE,
[Vol. 26:2
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Part II of this article will explore the traditional admiralty laws
of salvage and finds, under which the ownership and disposition of
historic shipwrecks has often been accomplished. As will be seen,
traditional admiralty law is inept to protect historic shipwrecks.
Part III will point out some of the problems encountered with us-
ing admiralty law to protect historic shipwrecks and make sugges-
tions for change.
II. THE TRADITIONAL ANARCHY
In 1889, the court in Murphy v. Dunha' 8 declared that it was
"[iln a barbarous state of society [that] wrecks were treated as the
lawful plunder of the first comer, or the lord of the soil.... . 19
Over a century later, the majority of courts in the United States
continue to apply salvage law, or the law of finds, to historic ship-
wrecks. Cases adjudicating the rights of salvors in historic vessels
that they have salvaged, or found and reduced to possession, are
typically brought in federal court.2O
In determining whether the law of salvage or finds applies,
courts first determine whether a shipwreck is abandoned or merely
BREAKING THE MAYA CODE (1992) (detailing the history of decipherment of Mayan
hieroglyphs). Because many were lost we have only a small number of extant writ-
ings to work from, which resulted in it taking a long time to decipher the Mayan
written word. See id. If treasure hunters are allowed to exploit submerged ar-
chaeological resources, society may ultimately miss out on the opportunity to learn
substantial quantities of as yet unknown knowledge. Suppose Atlantis or some
other drowned city were to be found beneath the waves? Treasure salvors would
attempt to "save" the few great treasures to be found, which would be sold for a
profit. What would be lost in the process are the innumerable mundane, yet sci-
entifically important, data that would tell us how the average inhabitant of the now
submerged city actually lived. For Plato's story of Atlantis, see PLATO, TIMAEUS &
CRrtAs (Desmond Lee trans., Penguin Books 1977); cf. RAND FLEM-ANTH & ROSE
FLEM-ANTH, WHEN THE SKY FELL: IN SFARCH OF ATLANTIS (1995) (arguing that At-
lantis never "sank;" rather, it is on Lesser Antarctica and was covered by ice after
the last earth crust displacement).
18. 38 F. 503, 507 (E.D. Mich. 1889).
19. Id.
20. The federal courts have generally been granted exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate admiralty and maritime causes of action. SeeU.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
1 (granting the judiciary the right to hear admiralty and maritime causes of ac-
tion); 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1994); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked
& Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 566 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[Claims arising
out of salvage operations ... are, unquestionably, within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts."); see also People v. Massey, 358 N.W.2d 615, 618 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1984) (stating that admiralty law governs the right to salvage); Sturgis v. Law,
5 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (3 Sand. Ch.) 451, 456-61 (1850) (discussing why state common law
courts do not have jurisdiction to hear salvage claims).
200
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derelict. If the owner intended to divest himself of ownership of a
vessel, and there is some act or omission tending to prove this in-
tent, then the vessel is abandoned and the courts apply the law of
finds.2 If the owner was merely divested of possession of a vessel,
without any intention to divest himself of ownership, then the ves-22
sel is derelict and courts apply the law of salvage. A government
vessel is not abandoned unless there is some affirmative act by the
23government to abandon the vessel.
21. The test for abandonment in admiralty is the same as that under the
common law; i.e., there must be an intent to abandon the property coupled with
an act or omission effectuating that intent. See, e.g., Livermore v. White, 43 Am.
Rep. 600, 601, 74 Me. 452, 455 (1883); Shepard v. Alden, 161 Minn. 135, 139, 201
N.W. 537, 539 (1924), affd on reh'g, 161 Minn. 135, 202 N.W. 71 (1925); Dober v.
Ukase Inv. Co., 10 P.2d 356, 357 (Or. 1932). But note, in the more recent historic
shipwreck cases, the courts have split as to whether abandonment can be inferred
merely from the passage of time. See John Paul Jones, The United States Supreme
Court and Treasure Salvage: Issues Remaining After Brother Jonathan, 30J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 205, 214-15 n.2 (1999). See also Fairport Int'l Exploration v. Shipwrecked
Vessel, 177 F. 3d 491 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing abandonment in treasure salvage
cases).
22. A derelict vessel is only factually, but not legally abandoned. See Alexan-
der Korthals Altes, Submarine Antiquities: A Legal Labyrinth, 4 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. &
COM. 77, 85 n.34 (1976). That is, the ship owner is typically divested of possession
of the ship, but does not have the intention to divest himself or herself of owner-
ship. See id.; see alsoJohn W. Grigg, The Michigan Aboriginal Records and Antiquities
Act: A Constitutional Question, 65 MIcH. B.J. 432, 433 (1986). The law of salvage is
premised upon the assumption that the owner of the vessel and/or cargo has not
divested himself or herself of ownership. See, e.g., Jupiter Wreck, Inc. v. The Uni-
dentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 691 F. Supp. 1377, 1388 (S.D. Fla.
1988); Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged from the Nashville, 606 F.
Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 775 F.2d 302 (lth Cir. 1985).
23. There are approximately two thousand sunken ships worldwide over
which the U.S. Navy acts as "custodian," as these ships have not been affirmatively
abandoned. See David J. Cooper, In the Drink: Naval Aviation Resources and Archae-
ology, in UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SOCIETY FOR
HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY CONFERENCE 134, 134 (Robyn P. Woodward & Charles
D. Moore eds., 1994). Only Congress has the power to dispose of, and promulgate
rules and regulations relating to the disposal of, property belonging to the United
States. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also Philip A. Berns, A Sovereign's Perspec-
tive on Treasure Salvage, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 269, 269-70 n.2 (1999) (discussing
federal ownership of shipwrecks). Therefore, with government vessels, Congress
must make some affirmative act of abandonment, or the title to the vessel remains
in the government. See, e.g., United States v. Steinmetz, 763 F. Supp. 1293, 1299
(D. N.J. 1991) (holding that a sunken Confederate warship is the property of the
United States government), affd, 973 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1992); Hatteras, Inc. v.
The U.S.S. Hatteras, 1984 A.M.C. 1094, 1098 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (stating that a fed-
eral officer can only abandon United States' property if authorized by Congress to
do so, and then only in the manner explicitly prescribed by Congress), vacated in
part on other grounds, 1984 A.M.C. 1102 (5th Cir. 1982). For a further discussion of
this topic, see generally Robert S. Neyland, Sovereign Immunity and the Management
[Vol. 26:2
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A. The Law of Salvage
The law of salvage24 is of ancient origin and developed to pro-
mote commerce by encouraging people to save property from de-
struction at sea and discourage embezzlement of salvaged prop-
erty.25 Salvage law, unlike the common law, grants an award to an
individual who voluntarily saves another person's property.7 Any
stranded, sunken, or otherwise imperiled vessel, cargo, or freight in
28navigable waters is held to be a proper object for salvage.
of United States Naval Shipwrecks, in UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY 98 (Stephen R.
James, Jr. & Camille Stanley eds., 1996) (discussing the law surrounding govern-
ment shipwrecks).
24. The U.S. Supreme Court, in The "Sabine," 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879), de-
fined salvage as "the compensation allowed to persons by whose voluntary assis-
tance a ship at sea or her cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from
impending sea peril, or in recovering such property from actual peril or loss, as in
cases of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture." In addition to being the name of the
award one is entitled to for saving imperiled property, the term "salvage" is also
used to describe the service of saving property. See Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co.,
119 U.S. 625, 628 (1887) (discussing various definitions of salvage). All nations
have recognized the principles of salvage law. "It has been declared that salvage is
a question arising under the jus gentium [law of nations] and does not ordinarily
depend upon the municipal laws of particular countries." 3A MARTINJ. NORRIS,
BENEDIcT ONADMIRALT § 14 (1997) (citations omitted).
25. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869); B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller
v. United States, 702 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1983) (relating history and citing
sources); 2 THOMAsJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 14-1 (2d ed.
1994).
26. An individual who renders salvage service is known as a "salvor." "[A] sal-
vor is defined to be a person who, without any particular relation to the ship in
distress, proffers useful service and gives it as a volunteer adventurer without any
pre-existing contract that connected him with the duty of employing himself for
the preservation of the vessel." The Clarita & The Clara, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 1, 16
(1874).
27. See Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240, 266 (1804) (noting the
difference between the common law and maritime law rules). It should be noted
that courts in the United States generally do not consider a salvor's motives when
allotting a salvage award. See B. V. Bureau Wijsmuller, 702 F.2d at 339; Unnamed but
Identifiable Master & Crew v. Certain Unnamed Motor Vessel, 592 F. Supp. 1191,
1194 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
28. The general rule is that so long as the property was engaged in some sort
of commerce or transportation over navigable waters, a salvage award should be
allowed. See 3A NORRIS, supra note 24, at § 34. Many items, such as logs, have
been held to be proper objects for salvage awards. See, e.g., Tidewater Salvage, Inc.
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 633 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1980); Bywater v. A Raft of
Piles, 42 F. 917, 918 (D. Wash. 1890); Fifty Thousand Feet of Timber, 9 F. Cas. 47,
48 (D.C. Mass. 1871) (No. 4783); Raft of Spars, 20 F. Cas. 173, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1849)
(No. 11,529). Even money found on a floating dead body has been held to be sub-
ject to a salvage award. See Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Three
Dollars, 72 F. Supp. 115, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1947), affd, 78 F. Supp. 635, 637 (E.D.N.Y.
20001
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In order for a salvor to establish a valid salvage claim, three
elements must be shown: (1) the services rendered must have been
voluntary on the part of the salvor, (2) the salvor must have been
successful in salvaging some of the property, and (3) the property
must have been in marine peril.29 Each element deserves brief ex-
plication.
First, to assert a valid salvage claim, the salvor must have acted
voluntarily. 0 The key to determining whether a salvor's action was
voluntary is to see if that salvor was under any obligation to render
assistance. Where one is under such an obligation, there cannot beS 31
a valid salvage claim. One eminent authority stated
"[v] oluntariness is the sine qua non of marine salvage. Without this
element there can be no salvage award."
32
Second, a salvor must have been successful in saving some
property before a salvage award will be granted.33 The Supreme
Court, in The "Sabine," stated that "[p] roof of success, to some ex-
tent, is as essential as proof of service, for if the property is not
saved, or if it perishes ... no compensation will be allowed. " 34 The
court in B. V Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States35 stated that the pur-
pose of salvage is to confer a benefit upon the owner of the dis-
tressed or abandoned vessel; i.e., the saving of the owner's prop-
1948); Gardner v. Ninety-Nine Gold Coins, 111 F. 552, 553 (D. Mass. 1899).
29. These three factors have long been utilized for determining whether one
is entitled to a salvage award. See, e.g., "Sabine," 101 U.S. at 384; Blackwall, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) at 12; The M.B. Stetson, 16 F. Cas. 1272, 1273 (D. Mass. 1866) (No.
9363); Montgomery v. The T.P. Leathers, 17 F. Cas. 640, 643 (E.D. La. 1852) (No.
9736).
30. It is generally assumed that without some strong evidence of a binding
contractual agreement, or legal obligation, to proffer salvage service, a salvor is
entitled to a salvage award. See The Camanche, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 448, 477 (1869).
Merely requesting help from a salvor is not sufficient, standing alone, to prove the
existence of a contract. See Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512,
404 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1968).
31. A traditional case was where firemen brought a salvage claim. If the fire-
men were determined to have been under an obligation to put out the fire, the
firemen would not have a valid claim. See, e.g., Firemen's Charitable Ass'n v. Rose,
60 F. 456, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1893); Murphy v. Ship Suliote, 5 F. 99, 100 (C.C.D. La.
1880); Davey v. The Mary Frost, 7 F. Cas. 14, 15 (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1876) (No. 3592).
32. 3A NORRis, supra note 24, at § 12.
33. Success means that at least some of the imperiled property is returned to
its owner. See id. § 96. It is necessary for at least some of the vessel and/or its
cargo to have survived, as the salvage award is made out of the property saved. See
2 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 25, at § 14-1.
34. "Sabine," 101 U.S. at 384; accord Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 12;
McNabb v. O.S. Bowfin, 565 F. Supp. 22, 23 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
35. 702 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 26:2
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erty.36 If a salvor is not successful, he has not conferred any benefit
on the property's owner, and he should not receive an award.
37
Finally, maritime property must be in marine peril.38  This
third element is indispensable to establish a valid salvage claim.3
9
Deciding whether sufficient peril exists is typically a factual ques-
tion determined from the circumstances of each case.4 Some
courts require that a vessel and/or its cargo be subjected to actual
pecuniary loss, 41 that a vessel and/or its cargo be in an unknown lo-
42
cation, or that a vessel might have been injured by the elements• . 43
but for its "rescue" by a salvor. Frequently, courts find marine
peril when a vessel is merely stranded. 44 It is important to note that
a salvor cannot receive a salvage award if he was responsible for
36. See id.
37. See id. A salvor who attempts to save maritime property, but is unsuccess-
ful, no matter how valiant the effort, will not be rewarded. See 3A NORRIS, supra
note 24, at § 89.
38. To determine whether a vessel is in marine peril, courts inquire into
whether the property was in a situation where it was exposed to a risk of loss.
There only needs to be a reasonable apprehension of loss. See The Saragossa, 21
F. Cas. 425, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 12,334). The peril does not need to be im-
mediate or actual. See Cargill, Inc. v. M/T Pac. Dawn, 876 F. Supp. 508, 511 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Reynolds Leasing Corp. v. Tug Patrice McAllister, 572 F. Supp.
1131, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); The Plymouth Rock, 9 F. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1881).
However, if a vessel is under its own control, there is no peril. See 2 SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 25, at § 14-1. The amount of peril is irrelevant to satisfy this element. It
is only necessary that there is some peril. The degree of peril does become impor-
tant, however, in determining the amount of the salvage award. See 3A NORRIS,
supra note 24, at § 63.
39. See Clifford v. M/V Islander, 846 F.2d 111, 112 (1st Cir. 1988) (per cu-
riam); Sobonis v. Steam Tanker Nat'l Defender, 298 F. Supp. 631, 635 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); The John Wurts, 13 F. Cas. 903,905 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 7434).
40. See Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139
(5th Cir. 1968); 3A NORRIS, supra note 24, at § 66.
41. See Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 518 F. Supp.
816, 821 (W.D. Tex. 1981), affd in part and vacated in part, 695 F.2d 893 (5th Cir.
1983).
42. See Thompson v. One Anchor & Two Anchor Chains, 221 F. 770, 773
(W.D. Wis. 1915) (finding marine peril where anchors and chains were lost).
43. See Conolly v. S.S. Karina II, 302 F. Supp. 675, 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
44. See Markakis v. S/S Volendam, 486 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Stranded vessels typically do not have to be in danger of destruction. Merely being
stranded is often held to be sufficient. See Sobonis, 298 F. Supp. at 636; see also The
Leonie 0. Louise, 4 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1925) (stating subjection to elements is
sufficient); The St. Paul, 86 F. 340, 343 (2d Cir. 1898) (noting that not making
money and eroding owners' good reputation while stranded is sufficient peril);
The Sandringham, 10 F. 556, 574-75 (E.D. Va. 1882) (finding possible destruction
due to elements to be sufficient).
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causing a condition that put the vessel and its cargo into peril.4 5 If
there is no peril, an individual is not a salvor, but an opportunist or
officious intermeddler, and he is not entitled to a salvage award.48
If the three above criteria are satisfied, a salvor is entitled to an
award. An award is usually paid from the proceeds when the saved
maritime property is sold. In order to determine the amount of a
salvage award, courts have typically considered six factors:
(1.) The labor expended by the salvors in rendering the
salvage service. (2.) The promptitude, skill, and energy
displayed in rendering the service and saving the prop-
erty. (3.) The value of the property employed by the sal-
vors in rendering the service, and the danger to which
such property was exposed. (4.) The risk incurred by the
salvors in securing the property from the impending peril.
(5.) The value of the property saved. (6.) The degree of
danger from which the property was rescued.48
45. See The Clarita & The Clara, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 1, 18-19 (1874); Unnamed
but Identifiable Master & Crew v. Certain Unnamed Motor Vessel, 592 F. Supp.
1191,1194 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
46. See Phelan v. Minges, 170 F. Supp. 826, 828 (D. Mass. 1959). For a further
discussion of maritime peril, see generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Nature
and Extent of Peril Necessary to Support Claim for Maritime Salvage, 26 A.L.R. FED. 858
(1976).
47. See Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found & Salvaged from the Nashville, 606
F. Supp. 801, 804 (S.D. Ga. 1984), affd, 775 F.2d 302 (11th Cir. 1985). In treasure
salvage cases, courts have been known to deviate from the rule that salvors are only
entitled to monetary awards, and have given awards in specie. See Columbus-
America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 469 (4th Cir.
1992). The reason put forth is that the artifacts are uniquely and intrinsically
valuable. See id.; Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 556 F. Supp. 1319, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1983). But see 2 SCHOENBAUM, sU-
pra note 25, at § 14-7 n.58 (claiming that granting salvage awards in specie is "con-
trary to fundamental principles of salvage law").
48. These six factors originally came from Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14
(1869), and have been followed by most courts. See, e.g., B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v.
United States, 702 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir. 1983) (ranking factors by importance);
W.E. Rippon & Son v. United States, 348 F.2d 627, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1965) (approv-
ing of factors enunciated in Blackwall). A few courts have followed the factors set
forth in Blackwall, but stated that extra factors should also be taken into considera-
tion when fixing a salvage award. See, e.g., Columbus-America Discovery Group, 974
F.2d at 468 (stating an additional factor is "the degree to which the salvors have
worked to protect the historical and archeological value of the wreck and items
salved."); The Sandringham, 10 F. 556, 573 (E.D. Va. 1882) (stating another con-
sideration should be "[t]he degree of success achieved, and the proportions of
value lost and salved").
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There is no fixed rate for a salvage award,49 although they have
traditionally been given to successful salvors in generous amounts. 
°
However, the salvage award cannot exceed the value of the prop-
51
erty salvaged.
B. The Law of Finds
The law of finds developed at common law, but has been
52
adopted into United States admiralty law. As one commentator
stated, "[a] 'find' in maritime law differs from salvage in that in the
49. A salvage award is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
the particular facts of the case. See Allseas Maritime, S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, 812 F.2d
243, 246 (5th Cir. 1987); Trico Marine Operators, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 809 F.
Supp. 440, 441 (E.D. La. 1992).
50. See, e.g., The "Sabine," 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879); Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) at 14; Rickard v. Pringle, 293 F. Supp. 981, 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); The
Charles Henry, 5 F. Cas. 509, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 2617). In a classic state-
ment of public policy, the court in Warder v. La Belle Creole, 29 F. Cas. 215, 217 (D.
Penn. 1792) (No. 17,165), announced that "[t]he general principle is not con-
fined to mere quantum meruit, as to the person saving; but is expanded, so as to
comprehend a reward for the risk of life and property, labour and danger, in the
undertaking, as well as a premium operating as an inducement to similar exer-
tions." When not much property is saved, the award will not be as great as if the
entire vessel and/or its cargo had been saved. See The Isaac Allerton, 13 F. Cas.
131, 133 (S.D. Fla. 1856) (No. 7088). This is because when much is lost, courts do
not want to aggravate the loss to the owner by charging a large salvage award. See
id. Also, less property exists from which an award can be given. See id.
51. Salvage service may exceed the value of the property salvaged. See Brady
v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1960). However,
the salvage award cannot exceed the value of the property. See "Sabine," 101 U.S.
at 390; Trico Marine Operators, 809 F. Supp. at 441; 2 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 25, at
§ 14-5.
52. See Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp.
953, 965 n.22 (M.D. Fla. 1993). The law of finds has not been adopted into gen-
eral international admiralty law. SeeJohn P. Fry, The Treasure Below:Jurisdiction Over
Salving Operations in International Waters, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 863, 880 (1988). Many
United States courts have applied the law of finds to abandoned maritime prop-
erty. See Sub-Sal., Inc. v. The Debraak, No. CIV.A.84-296-CMW, 1992 WL 39050, at
*2 (D. Del. Feb. 4, 1992) (shipwreck); Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Ital-
ian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 457 (E.D. Va. 1960) (marble); Commonwealth v.
Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc., 531 N.E.2d 549, 551-52 (Mass. 1988) (ship-
wreck); see also 3A NORRIS, supra note 24, at § 158 n.4 ("This author would limit the
doctrine of 'find' relative to marine disasters to long-lost wrecks ... where the
owners of maritime properties have publicly abandoned them."); Thomas E. Lo-
hrey, Sunken Vessels, Their Cargoes, and the Casual Salvor, JAG J., July-Aug. 1965, at
25, 29 (advocating the use of the law of finds). Others have criticized the applica-
tion of the law of finds when dealing with abandoned shipwrecks. See Fry, supra at
877 n.99 (citing critics and stating that the law of finds promotes "lawlessness and
piracy"); id. at 878-81 (reciting some of the advantages of applying salvage law).
2000]
11
McQuown: An Archaeological Argument for the Inapplicability of Admiralty L
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
former instance the property found has never been owned by any
person. It therefore belongs to the finder."5 3 This view has been
broadened, and the law of finds is occasionally applied to historic
shipwrecks. 54
Under the law of finds, tide to abandoned property will vest
in the first person to find it and reduce it to his possession. 55 Such
property is said to be res nullius.56 A finder acquires title to aban-
doned property by "occupancy," i.e., by taking dominion and con-
trol over it.57 Once a finder has taken dominion and control over
the abandoned property, he holds title to it, which is good against
the whole world including the original owner.58
53. 3A Norris, supra note 24, at § 158. The court in Columbus-America Discovery
Group, 974 F.2d at 459, stated that "[t]raditionally, the law of finds was applied
only to maritime property which had never been owned by anybody, such as am-
bergris, whales, and fish." Some courts have asserted that under the law of finds
shipwrecks have reverted to a "state of nature," and may therefore be appropriated
by the first to reduce them to possession. See Lathrop, 817 F. Supp. at 965.
54. One early case stated that "[t]he wrecked vessel after abandonment has
no owner." In re Highland Navigation Corp., 24 F.2d 582, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1927),
aff'd, 29 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1928). The court in Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F. Supp.
1042, 1048-49 (E.D. Va. 1995), affid, 99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1093 (1998), noting this trend to apply the law of finds to historic shipwrecks,
stated: " [T] raditionally the law of finds was applied only to marine property which
had never been owned by anybody. Yet recent trends suggest applying the law of
finds when there has been a finding that the sunken property has been aban-
doned by its previous owners." One explanation for expanding the law of finds to
cover historic shipwrecks may be mere administrative convenience. See Marilyn L.
Lytle, Treasure Salvage, 24J. MAR. L. & CoM. 403, 410 (1993). By awarding title of a
res to the finder, the court does not have to have the property sold in order to pay
the salvor's lien. See id.
55. Property that is abandoned has "returned to the common mass of things,
in a state of nature, which belongs to the first occupant or finder, the owner not
appearing.... " Ferguson v. Ray, 77 P. 600, 602 (Or. 1904). Title to abandoned
property passes to its finder once he takes it into his possession. See Ritz v. Selma
United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 1991); Foulke v. New York
Consol. R.R. Co., 127 N.E. 237, 238 (N.Y. 1920).
56. SeeThe Tubantia [1924] P. 78, 82.
57. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 556 F. Supp. 1319, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1983). Thus, one does not acquire title
merely because he has found abandoned property. See id.; see also Maritime Under-
water Surveys, 531 N.E.2d at 551. The occupancy requirement is satisfied when the
finder takes actual or constructive possession of the find. See Lathrop, 817 F. Supp.
at 965.
58. See Bemis, 884 F. Supp. at 1049; Herron v. Whiteside, 782 S.W.2d 414, 417
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam). The reason that the original owner of the
property does not have a right to claim the property is because once one abandons
property, it is as if that property had never been owned. See 2 SCHOENBAUM, Supra
note 25, at § 14-7. However, a finder is not entitled to title if the original owner is
able to prove that the property was not in fact abandoned. See id.
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At common law, there are two recognized exceptions to the
rule that a finder of abandoned property takes title to the property
when he reduces it to his possession, even if it is discovered on an-
other person's land. First, the title to abandoned property that is
"embedded in the soil" does not vest in its finder. 9 Rather, aban-
doned property that is embedded in the soil vests in the owner of
the land where it is found.r° Second, where the owner of the locus
where the property is found asserts "constructive possession" over
the property, it is not considered abandoned, and title to it vests in
the owner of the land.6' These two common law exceptions to the
law of finds have generally been accepted as a part of United States
62admiralty law.
There are many who believe that the laws of salvage and finds
do not recognize "the public interest in the nonmonetary value in-
herent in ancient shipwrecks and associated materials," and thus
that these laws should not be applied to historic shipwrecks. s
59. See Ray Andrews Brown, The Law of Personal Property § 3.2 (3d ed.
1975).
60. See Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269; Morgan v. Wiser, 711 S.W.2d 220, 222 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1985). For example, it has been held that metal tokens buried in a na-
tional park, United States v. Shivers, 96 F.3d 120, 124 (5th Cir. 1996); an aerolite
embedded in the ground, Goodard v. Winchell, 52 N.W. 1124, 1125 (Iowa 1892); a
prehistoric canoe found protruding from the banks of a river, Allred v. Biegel, 219
S.W.2d 665, 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (per curiam); buried earthenware, Burdick v.
Chesebrough, 88 N.Y.S. 13, 16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904); embedded pieces of gold-
bearing quartz, Ferguson v. Ray, 77 P. 600, 603 (Or. 1904); and a two-thousand
year old boat buried in the earth, Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., 33 Ch. D. 562, 568-69
(1886), all belonged to the owner of the property in which they were found.
61. See Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d
1511, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1985). Constructive possession "has been generally defined
as knowingly having both the power and intention at a given time to exercise do-
minion or control over the property." United States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 382, 384
(9th Cir. 1970); accord United States v. Holland, 445 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(defining constructive possession as "being in a position to exercise dominion or
control over a thing") (citation omitted); Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306,
311 (9th Cir. 1960) ("Constructive possession is that which exists without actual
personal occupation of land or without actual personal present dominion over a
chattel, but with an intent and capability to maintain control and dominion.").
62. At least one judge has doubted the applicability of these land-based ex-
ceptions to the law of finds when applied to abandoned historic shipwrecks. In
Klein, 758 F.2d at 1515, Kravitch, C.J. (specially concurring and dissenting in part),
stated that "the 'embedded in the soil' and 'constructive possession' exceptions to
the common law of finds.., are of dubious relevance in the context of a sunken
ship ...." The majority of courts, however, have not rejected these two common
law exceptions.
63. Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U.L. REv. 559, 609 (1995). The comments of Rep-
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There are others, of course, who believe that treasure hunters have
contributed greatly to our understanding of maritime history and
should not be condemned or stopped from continuing their ef-
forts.6 4 In the following section, it will be suggested that submerged
archaeological resources, wherever found, should not be governed
by admiralty law and subject to treasure salvage.
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL
The admiralty laws of salvage and finds should never apply to
the recovery of artifacts from historically significant shipwrecks.
Traditionally, admiralty law has not considered factors such as ar-
chaeological or historical significance.6 Over a decade ago, Con-
gress passed the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA).66 The
resentative Vento are characteristic of this view. He stated:
There needs to be a very clear distinction made between the reasons for
admiralty law and those for historic preservation and recreation. Admi-
ralty law seeks to: First, regulate maritime commerce; second, to protect
sailors, third, to adjudicate claims between shippers; and fourth, in the
case of salvage, to save lives on ships in distress and to return goods to
commerce. Admiralty law has no particular interest in these abandoned
shipwrecks as defined in [the proposed Abandoned Shipwreck Act of
1987].
134 CONG. REC. H1463-04 (Apr. 13, 1988); accord John M. Bondareff, Protection of
Historic Shipwrecks in State Waters, 4 COASTAL ZONE 3514, 3521 (1989) ("[T]here is
no compelling commercial reason to return shipwrecks and their artifacts to the
flow of marine commerce... ."); Eleanor Sharpston, Underwater Archaeology and
Wreck Sites: A Legal Perspective, in UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROCEEDINGS FROM THE
SOCIETY FOR HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY CONFERENCE 62, 63 (John D. Broadwater
ed., 1991) (arguing that salvage "law, with its focus on commercial worth and re-
trieval of wrecked material to minimize economic loss from shipwreck, is ill-
designed to provide effective protection for archaeological wreck sites").
64. See Melvin A. Fisher, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act: The Role of Private Enter-
prise, 12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 373, 376 (1988) ("It is a simple fact that with bu-
reaucratic archaeologists in control, the era of private enterprise recovery of an-
cient shipwrecks will be over.").
65. See Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be
the "Seabird," 941 F.2d 525, 529-30 (7th Cir. 1991).
66. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1994 & Supp. 1999). The ASA was proposed and
eventually enacted as "a direct result of the failure of the State of Florida to win its
battle against Mel Fisher and his company Treasure Salvors, Inc., in Federal dis-
trict court." 134 CONG. REC. H1469 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Fields). For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the ASA, see gen-
erally David R. Owen, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Good-Bye to Salvage in the
Territorial Sea, 19 J. MAR. L. & COM. 499 (1988) [hereinafter Owen, Abandoned
Shipwreck Act]. See also Anne G. Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act Through the
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ASA declares that the states have the responsibility for the man-
agement of many "living and nonliving resources" on state sub-
merged lands. Included in the group of nonliving resources over
which states have a management responsibility are "certain aban-
doned shipwrecks. "68 Of importance for this article, the ASA spe-
cifically removes the shipwrecks covered by its provisions from the
laws of salvage and finds.69 Thus, many historic shipwrecks located
Eyes of its Drafter, 30J. MAR. L. & COM. 167, 168-70 (1999) (discussing the back-
ground to the ASA as perceived by the statute's drafter).
67. See 43 U.S.C. § 2101(a). "State" is defined as "a state of the United States,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa,
and the Northern Marina Islands[." Id. § 2102(e). The term "submerged lands"
includes lands under navigable waters of the states, as defined by section 1301 of
title 43 of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (SLA). See id. § 2102(f)(1). Under
the SLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1994), Congress granted title to the submerged
lands off the coasts to the states, typically for a distance of three miles. See id. §
1312. Off the coast of Texas, Puerto Rico, and the west coast of Florida, however,
the states hold title to nine miles of submerged lands. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-514
(II), Pub. L. No. 100-298, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 370, 370.
68. See 43 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (emphasis added). Under the ASA, the United
States asserts tide to abandoned shipwrecks that are: (1) embedded in the sub-
merged land within a state's territorial waters, (2) embedded in coralline forma-
tions that are protected by a state and that are on submerged lands within a state's
territorial waters, and (3) located on submerged lands within a state's territorial
waters and are included or are determined to be eligible for inclusion in the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places. See id. § 2105(a). Title to the shipwrecks that
the United States asserts title to is then transferred to the state in which, or on
whose lands, the shipwrecks are discovered. See id. § 2105(c). The ASA is not con-
cerned with "recent shipwrecks." 134 CONG. REc. Hl177-02 (daily ed. Mar. 28,
1988) (statement of Rep. Vento).
69. See 43 U.S.C. 2106(a) ("The law of salvage and the law of finds shall not
apply to abandoned shipwrecks to which section 2105 of this title applies."). Con-
gress made it clear that admiralty law is inappropriate for certain historic ship-
wrecks. See H.R. REP. No. 100-514 (I), Pub. L. No. 199-298, at 2, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 365, 366. The ASA does not change admiralty laws in respect to
those shipwrecks not covered by its provisions. See 43 U.S.C. § 2106(b). Although
laudable in its attempt to remove certain shipwrecks from admiralty law, the ASA
has one potential flaw: it is probably unconstitutional. Two courts have upheld the
ASA's constitutionality. See generally Zych 941 F.2d at 533-35 (7th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing the ASA constitutional against attacks that it impermissibly excludes from the
admiralty court's jurisdiction something that falls clearly within it, that it violates
the principle that admiralty law must be uniform, that it violates the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, and that it violates the Tenth Amendment), on
remand, 811 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. I11. 1992), affd, 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1994);
Sunken Treasure, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 857 F.
Supp. 1129, 1133, 1136 (D. V.I. 1994) (holding the ASA constitutional against at-
tacks that it impermissibly excludes from the admiralty court's jurisdiction some-
thing that falls clearly within it, that it violates the principle that admiralty law
must be uniform, and that it violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
One district court intimated that the ASA might be unconstitutional. See Deep Sea
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on state submerged lands will be governed by the states' shipwreck
preservation law. 70  However, historic shipwrecks located beyond
Research, Inc. v. BrotherJonathan, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1359 (N.D. Cal. 1995), af'd,
102 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996), affid in part and vacated in part sub nom. California v.
Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. 491 (1998); see also Robert Miller, Note, Charting the
Future of Historic Shipwreck Legislation in California: Application of the English Model in
the Salvage of the BrotherJonathan, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 793, 802-804
(1994) (recounting the arguments made by Deep Sea Research in asserting that
the ASA is unconstitutional). Many commentators have argued that the ASA is
probably unconstitutional. See David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the
Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 29-32 (1997) (discussing the pos-
sibility that the ASA violates the constitution by unconstitutionally disturbing the
uniformity of admiralty law); Denise B. Feingold, Note, The Abandoned Shipwreck
Act of 1987: Navigating Turbulent Constitutional Waters?, 10 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 361,
391-97 (1990) (stating that Congress impermissibly excluded an established aspect
of admiralty law, and that state statutes are preempted by admiralty law and un-
constitutional because they are non-uniform); Owen, Abandoned Shipwreck Act, su-
pra note 66, at 512-16 (same); Peter Tomlinson, Comment, "Full Fathom Five": Legal
Hurdles to Treasure, 42 EMORY L.J. 1099, 1116-32 (1993) (discussing the possibility
that the ASA violates the constitution by unconstitutionally disturbing the uni-
formity of admiralty law). But see Timothy T. Stevens, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act
of 1987: Finding the Proper Ballast for the States, 37 ViLL. L. REv. 573, 604-611 (1992)
(averring that the ASA does not disturb the uniformity of admiralty law, that it is
not an unconstitutional delegation of powers to the states, and that state shipwreck
legislation is not an excessive burden on interstate commerce).
70. Note, however, that the ASA only grants certain abandoned shipwrecks to
the states. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101(b), 2102(d). Submerged archaeological re-
sources other than shipwrecks are not covered. See id. States could attempt to
claim that they hold tide to such resources under the SLA. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1315; supra note 67 (discussing the SLA). Under this statute, the states hold title
to the lands under navigable waters within their boarders and also to the lands be-
neath the waters off their coasts, typically for three miles, and all "natural re-
sources" found in and above them. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (a) & 1312. Prior to the
enactment of the ASA, the states attempted to assert title to abandoned historic
shipwrecks under the SLA, claiming that the wrecks were included within the
statutory definition of "natural resources." See id. § 1301 (e) (defining "natural re-
sources"). Most courts stated that the SLA did not pass tide to abandoned ship-
wrecks to the states. See Deep Sea Research, 883 F. Supp. at 1350; Sub-Sal., Inc. v. The
Debraak, No. CIV.A.84-296-CMW, 1992 WL 39050, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 4, 1992)
(stating that the SLA did not pass tide to shipwrecks and artifacts to the state);
Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be the SB "Lady
Elgin," 746 F. Supp. 1334, 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating that "a shipwreck is not
'natural'"), rev'd, 941 F.2d 525 (7th Cir. 1991); Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidenti-
fied, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1982);
Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F.
Supp. 186, 214-16 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Commonwealth v. Maritime Underwater Sur-
veys, Inc., 531 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Mass. 1988) (stating that the passage of the ASA
shows that SLA did not pass title of abandoned shipwrecks to the states). Even
commentators noted that the SLA did not explicitly grant title to abandoned
shipwrecks and other archaeological resources located on the states' submerged
lands to the states. See Thompson M. Mayes, Current Legal Issues in the Law of His-
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the three mile limit of state jurisdiction are still subject to the laws
of salvage and finds.7' This Part will suggest that neither salvage
toric Shipwrecks, 5 PRESERVATION L. REP. 2027, 2030 (1986); cf. Anthony Clark Ar-
end, Note, Archaeological and Historical Objects: The International Legal Implications of
UNCLOS III, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 777, 779 (1982) ("by definition.., archaeological
objects are not natural resources of the ocean floor."). However, at least one court
stated that historic shipwrecks were "natural resources" for the purposes of allow-
ing states to gain title to them under the SLA. See Subaqueous Exploration & Ar-
chaeology, Ltd. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 577 F. Supp. 597,
612-13 (D. Md. 1983) (arguing that "even though the ships and their cargo are
'man made' or objects not created exclusively through the forces of nature, those
marine antiquities can be characterized as 'natural resources' within the meaning
of the Submerged Lands Act."), aff'd, 765 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Marx v.
Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 300 (9th Cir. 1989) (disagreeing with the proposition that
the passage of the ASA indicated that Congress did not previously pass title to
abandoned historic shipwrecks to the states); Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked, &
Abandoned Vessel, Believed to be The "Seabird," 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1319 (N.D.
I11. 1992) (stating that section 2101 (a) of the ASA recognizes that states already
owned abandoned shipwrecks under the SLA), af'd, 19 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 1994);
Sindia Expedition, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known as The "Sindia",
710 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D. N.J. 1989) (implying that section 1311 (a) of the SLA
transferred shipwrecks to the states), rev'd on other grounds, 895 F.2d 116 (3rd Cir.
1990). A few cases held that the states owned submerged shipwrecks under the
rule of sovereign prerogative. See State ex rel. Burton v. Flying "W" Enterprises,
Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482, 492 (N.C. 1968) (following Massachusetts Co.); State v. Massa-
chusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902, 907 (Fla. 1957) (en banc) (holding that the state owns
abandoned vessels under common law sovereignty principles). These decisions
were based on the English common law. See, e.g., The King v. Forty Nine Casks of
Brandy, 166 Eng. Rep. 401, 409 (1836); The "Aquila," 165 Eng. Rep. 87, 89 (1798).
Thus, it is unlikely that a court will declare a state the owner of submerged ar-
chaeological resources, other than shipwrecks, if the state asserts ownership
merely under the SLA. However, the states could claim ownership over artifacts
embedded in their submerged lands, under the embedded in the soil exception to
the law of finds. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. A federal statute ex-
plicitly granting title to these resources in the states is probably necessary to clarify
any possible ambiguity. Nevertheless, many states have claimed ownership over all
submerged archaeological resources resting within their territorial limits. See, e.g.,
ALAsKA STAT. § 41.35.020(a) (Michie 1998); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6313(a) (West
Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-3-80 (1996); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6E-7(A)
(Michie Supp. 1999); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83B, § 5-627 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 6, § 180 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 39-7-9 (1996);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227-C:6(II) (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1506.33(A)
(West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-45.1-4(b) (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 54-7-630
(Law. Co-op. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 762 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-
2214B (Michie 1998); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 44.47(5) (West 1997).
71. In the remaining nine miles of the territorial sea, federal law protects the
majority of archaeological sites, although historic shipwrecks may be governed by
traditional principles of admiralty law. The Antiquities Act applies on lands that
the United States owns or controls. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994). Courts have held
that this act does not apply on the submerged lands that passed to the states under
the SLA. See United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32, 41 (1978); Subaqueous Ex-
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ploration & Archaeology, Ltd. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 577
F. Supp. 597, 610 (D. Md. 1983), affd, 765 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover,
the Antiquities Act does not apply on the continental shelf. See Treasure Salvors,
Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel Believed to be the Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha, 408
F. Supp. 907, 910-11 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (granting title to an abandoned shipwreck
located on the outer continental shelf to its finder, and holding that these lands
are not owned or controlled by the United States government), affd as modified,
569 F.2d 330, 337-40 (5th Cir. 1978). Nevertheless, if the President declared that a
nationally significant archaeological site located within the nine miles of territorial
seabed under federal jurisdiction was to become a national monument under the
Antiquities Act, see 16 U.S.C. § 431, a salvor would have to obtain a permit to exca-
vate or be subject to minor penalties. See id. § 432 (potential excavator must ob-
tain a permit), § 433 ($500 fine, or up to 90 days imprisonment, or both, for violat-
ing the Antiquities Act); see also Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 967 F.2d 1237, 1241 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that prosecut-
ing an individual under the Antiquities Act is little more than "a petty misde-
meanor criminal prosecution"). One possible problem with this Act is that one
court has held the penalty provision to be unconstitutionally vague. See United
States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974). But see United States v. Smyer,
596 F.2d 939, 940-41 (10th Cir. 1979) (refusing to follow Diaz and holding the An-
tiquities Act constitutional).
Under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA), any "ar-
chaeological resource" located on public or Indian lands, not including the conti-
nental shelf, is protected from injury or excavation without a permit. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 470ee(a)(1994). Although not listed as an archaeological resource entitled to
protection under ARPA, shipwrecks are listed as such a resource in the regula-
tions. See 43 C.F.R. § 7.3(a) (3) (ix) (1998). It is unclear whether Congress in-
tended ARPA to apply to historic shipwrecks in the navigable waters of the territo-
rial sea that are under federal jurisdiction, or whether Congress intended for them
to be governed by admiralty law.
Beyond the United States' territorial sea, there are primarily two statutes
that can be used to protect submerged archaeological sites out to the Interna-
tional Seabed Area. One statute is the Marine Protection, Research, & Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), under which the area surrounding a nationally significant
archaeological resource can be declared a national marine sanctuary. See 16
U.S.C. §§ 1431-1445 (1994 & Supp. 111996). The first national marine sanctuary
was designated on January 30, 1975, to protect the Civil War ironclad Monitor. See
generally Gordon P. Watts, Jr., A Decade of Research: Investigation of the USS Monitor, in
UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY CONFERENCE 128 (Alan B. Albright ed., 1987) (reporting archaeo-
logical investigations from the Monitor shipwreck site). Relatively few marine sanc-
tuaries have been established and some commentators have noted that the MPRSA
"may be insufficient to protect historic shipwrecks within and beyond the three-
mile territorial sea because of the complexity of the designation process, [and] the
desire to designate diverse ecological areas...." Robert E. Moyer, The Law of His-
toric Shipwrecks: Conflict & Controversy, 2 PRESERVATION L. REP. 2072, 2082 n.65
(1983); accord Mayes, supra note 71, at 2037 n.56 (stating that the complex desig-
nation process prevents the MPRSA from effectively protecting many historic
shipwrecks). Nevertheless, archaeological sites located within the few areas that
have been declared national marine sanctuaries receive a fair amount of protec-
tion. Those who loot, vandalize, or excavate sites without a permit have been ag-
gressively prosecuted and are potentially subject to substantial penalties. See, e.g.,
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16 U.S.C. §§ 1437(c) (1), (d)(1), (e)(2) (providing that any person who violates
the MPRSA is liable for a civil penalty up to $100,000 for each violation; any vessel
or other items used in violating the act, and any sanctuary resource appropriated,
is subject to forfeiture; and that person shall be liable for the costs incurred by the
Secretary in storing, caring for, and maintaining any property or sanctuary re-
source seized in connection with the violation); United States v. Fisher, 977 F.
Supp. 1193, 1200-01 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (fining treasure salvors for damaging over an
acre and a half of sea grass during treasure salvage operations within the Florida
Keys National Marine Sanctuary ); In re Craft, 6 Ocean Resources & Wildlife Rep.
150, 183 (NOAA 1990) (ordering six defendants to pay a fine of between $1,000
and $100,000 for looting shipwrecks and disturbing the seabed within the Channel
Islands National Marine Sanctuary). The MPRSA is also attractive as its penalty
provisions apply to United States citizens, nationals, and resident aliens as far out
as the U.S. exclusive economic zone. See 15 C.F.R. § 922.4 (1998) (noting, how-
ever, that the designation of an area as a national marine sanctuary outside of the
United States' territorial sea does not constitute any claim of sovereignty orjuris-
diction over the area, unless otherwise permitted by generally recognized princi-
ples of international law and other such laws to which the United States is a party).
A second statute that can be used to protect submerged archaeological
resources located beyond the limits of our territorial sea is the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470w-6 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
Under the NHPA, before commencement of certain proposed federal or federally
assisted "undertakings," the head of the agency proposing the undertaking must
take into account the effect of the undertaking on any property that is included in
or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. See id. § 470f; see also 36 C.F.R. §
800.2(o) (1997) (defining "undertaking"). The NHPA is primarily a procedural
statute. It does not mandate a particular outcome, but merely requires a federal
agency to comply with certain procedural requirements before ultimately deciding
whether to alter or destroy a historic property. See, e.g., Gettysburg Battlefield
Preservation Ass'n v. Gettysburg College, 799 F. Supp. 1571, 1580 (M.D. Pa. 1992),
affid, 989 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1993); Citizens for the Scenic Severn River Bridge, Inc.
v. Skinner, 802 F. Supp. 1325, 1337-38 (D. Md. 1991), affld, 972 F.2d 338 (4th Cir.
1992). Importantly, the procedural requirements mandated by the NHPA apply
all the way out to our continental shelf. See Clarification of Authorities and Re-
sponsibilities for Identifying and Protecting Cultural Resources on the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf, 87 Interior Dec. 593, 595-99 (DOI 1980). However, on the conti-
nental shelf these requirements only apply in connection with mineral activities.
See Melanie J. Stright, The Mineral Management Service's Archaeology Program, in
UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY CONFERENCE 5 (J. Barto Arnold III ed., 1989). As long as those en-
gaging in mineral activities on the continental shelf comply with the NHPA's pro-
cedures, they may potentially alter or destroy any submerged archaeological sites
they find. Moreover, "(t]he lessee, subcontractors of the lessee, or others gaining
access to a shipwreck's location are unrestricted in actions against the site as long
as their actions are not related directly to [continental shelf] oil and gas opera-
tions." James M. Parrent, Cultural Resource Management on the Outer Continental
Shelf, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH CONFERENCE ON UNDERWATER
ARCHAEOLOGY 82, 83 (Paul F. Johnston ed., 1985). Thus, this statute only requires
federal agencies and those engaging in mineral activities to jump through prover-
bial "hoops," and it does not generally prevent the alteration or destruction of
submerged archaeological sites.
Unless one of the above statutes applies, traditional admiralty law proba-
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nor finds law should ever apply to historic shipwrecks.
In order to make a salvage claim,12 a salvor must show that an
historic shipwreck is in "marine peril." One commentator correctly
stated that the concept of marine peril is stretched to its limits
when applied to ancient shipwrecks. By its very definition, treas-
ure salvage is the recovery of maritime property that has already ex-
perienced its peril and subsequent ruin; thus, the danger has
passed.74 Yet, some courts have determined, as a matter of law, that
marine peril exists with historic shipwrecks for the purposes of sat-
bly governs the salvage of submerged archaeological resources. Unfortunately,
"[t] reasure salvage has a low profile among the problems confronting Congress, so
it is unlikely that it will revisit the entire topic and impose uniform national solu-
tions." Joseph C. Sweeney, An Overview of Commercial Salvage Principles in the Context
of Marine Archaeology, 30J. MAR. L. & COM. 185, 203 (1999). Nevertheless, there
has been a growing trend in the international arena to protect submerged ar-
chaeological resources located beyond a coastal nation's territorial sea. In late
1997, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted a resolution announcing that
an international convention for the protection of such resources needed to be
promulgated. SeeJean Allain, Comment, Maritime Wrecks: Where the Lex Ferenda of
Underwater Cultural Heritage Collides with the Lex Lata of the Law of the Sea Convention,
38 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 766 (1998). See generally Etienne Clement & Lyndel V. Prott,
UNESCO and the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, MUSEUM INT'L, Oct.-
Dec. 1996, at 37 (providing background on the search for international legal stan-
dards to deal with underwater cultural property); Lyndel V. Prott, Safeguarding the
Underwater Cultural Heritage: UNESCO Moves Ahead, MUSEUM INT'L, Jan.-Mar. 1997,
at 39 (reporting the results of a meeting of experts to fill the legal gaps in the pro-
tection of underwater cultural heritage). UNESCO has since promulgated a Draft
Convention, though it has been criticized as not being "an international system for
protecting [underwater cultural resources (UCR)], but rather an agreement to re-
ject an international system for protecting UCR in favor of a national approach."
Richard T. Robol, Legal Protection for Underwater Cultural Resources: Can We Do Better!,
30J. MAR. L. & COM. 303, 305 (1999). For a scathing critique of the UNESCO
Draft Convention and an interesting, though pro-salvor, counter-proposal, see gen-
erally David J. Bederman, The UNESCO Draft Convention on Underwater Cultural Heri-
tage: A Critique and Counter-Proposal, 30J. MA. L. & COM. 331 (1999).
72. In order to make a salvage claim, a salvor must show that he acted volun-
tarily, that he was successful, and that the property was in peril. See supra note 29
and accompanying text. In treasure salvage cases, salvors can usually demonstrate
that they were not under an obligation to perform salvage services. See supra notes
29-31 and accompanying text. Also, bringing artifacts into court demonstrates
success. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text. Therefore, the only real
issue is whether the shipwreck is in peril.
73. See 2 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 25, at § 14-1. But see Treasure Salvors, Inc.
v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir.
1978) ("[d] isposition of a wrecked vessel whose very location has been lost for cen-
turies as though its owner were still in existence stretches a fiction to absurd
lengths.").
74. See Bruce E. Alexander, Treasure Salvage Beyond the Territorial Sea: An As-
sessment and Recommendations, 20J. MAR. L. & CoM. 1, 14 (1989).
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isfying the three criteria necessary to establish a valid salvage
claim. These courts justify their holding by asserting that the
"elements" could destroy the remaining maritime property. Thus,
these courts conclude that abandoned shipwrecks are still in "peril"
of being destroyed or lost.76 Other courts have explicitly rejected
this approach.
Whether historic vessels are in marine peril, and thus a proper
subject of salvage law, has attracted international debate. 78 In Simon
v. Taylor,79 the High Court of Singapore addressed the issue of
whether twelve tons of mercury, which had been recovered from
the German submarine U 859 and had been lying in international
waters for twenty-eight years, was the proper subject for a salvage
75. See Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 695 F.2d 893,
901 n.9 (5th Cir. 1983); Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 614
F.2d 1051, 1055 (5th Cir. 1980); Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d at 337 ("Marine peril
includes more than the threat of storm, fire, or piracy to a vessel in navigation.");
Bemis v. RMS Lusitania, 884 F. Supp. 1042, 1050 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("Courts will
usually find that underwater shipwrecks are in marine peril, because sunken ves-
sels and their cargoes are in danger of being lost forever."), aftd, 99 F.3d 1129
(4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1093 (1998); Lathrop v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953, 962 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 556 F. Supp.
1319, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F. Supp. 540, 557 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see also Klein v.
Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11 th Cir.
1985) (Kravitch, C.J., specially concurring and dissenting in part) (arguing that
the Eleventh Circuit should adopt the Fifth Circuit's reasoning).
76. It should be emphasized that it is, in large part, the admiralty courts that
are failing to protect submerged archaeological resources. Both the federal and
states' governments have taken laudable first steps to end the destruction of such
resources and their contextual data. See Ole Varmer, The Case Against the "Salvage"
of the Cultural Heritage, 30J. MAR. L. & COM. 279, 279 (1999) ("Although federal
and state agencies generally have sided with archaeologists, treasure salvors have
found refuge in the federal admiralty courts, which usually have held that salvage is
necessary in order to protect the shipwreck from a marine peril.").
77. See, e.g., Klein, 758 F.2d at 1515; Lathrop, 817 F. Supp. at 962; Subaqueous
Exploration & Archaeology, Ltd. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel,
577 F. Supp. 597, 611 (D. Md. 1983), affd, 765 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1985). In the
legislative history of the ASA, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
stated that it did not consider abandoned historic shipwrecks covered by the provi-
sions of the ASA to be in marine peril. The committee stated that such wrecks
were not in need of salvage services. See H.R. REP. No. 100-514, pt. 2, at 8 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 370, 377.
78. For a general discussion, see 1 LYNDELV. PROTT & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAWAND
THE CULTURAL HERITAGE 118-120 (1984); ANASTASIA STRATI, THE PROTECTION OF
UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE: AN EMERGING OBJECTIVE OF THE CONTEMPORARY
LAW OF THE SEA 48-49 (1995).
79. [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 338 (Sing.).
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award 80 The court stated that the "essence of a salvage service is
that it is a service rendered to property or life in danger and the
burden of proving the presence of danger rests upon those who
claim as salvors., 8' The purported salvors failed to carry their bur-
den, and the court held that the mercury was not subjected to an
immediate or pending peril.82
A contrary conclusion to that in Simon was reached in Robinson
v. Western Australian Museum.ss The object of this case was a Dutch
vessel named Gilt Dragon."4 This vessel was sailing from the East In-
dies to Holland, was blown off course, and crashed into an un-
85charted reef approximately forty miles from present day Perth.
The plaintiff had discovered the remains of the vessel and appro-
priated numerous artifacts from its wreckage. Judges Stephen and
Mason, relying on Morris v. Lyonesse Salvage Co. Ltd. and Tubantia,88
discussed the appropriateness of applying salvage law to historic
vessels. Although neither of the cases relied on by the judges di-
rectly addressed this issue, they served as the foundation for their
opinions. In sweeping language,Judge Mason stated:
It is sufficient to ground a claim for salvage that the salvor
save the ship, its cargo or apparel from the perils of the
sea or that he recover the ship, its cargo or a part thereof.
Salvage is not limited to recovery of property in or from a
ship which is actually in distress; it extends to the recovery
of property in or from a ship which has lain at the bottom
of the sea for a long time. 9
80. See id.
81. Id. at 344.
82. See id.
83. (1977) 16 A.L.R. 623 (Austl.). For an extensive discussion of this case, see
generally PatrickJ. O'Keefe & Lyndel V. Prott, Australian Protection of Historic Ship-
wrecks, in 2 MARINE ARcHAEOLOGY: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 463, 471-73 (G. Kup-
puram & K. Kumudamani eds., 1996) (updated version of their earlier article, Pat-
rick J. O'Keefe & Lyndel V. Prott, Australian Protection of Historic Shipwrecks, 6
AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 119, 127-30 (1974-75)); PatrickJ. O'Keefe, Maritime Archaeology
and Salvage Laws: Some Comments Following Robinson v. The Western Australian Mu-
seum, 7 INT'LJ. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERwATER EXPLORATION 3 (1978).
84. Robinson, 16 A.L.R. at 630 (Barwick, C.J.).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. (1970) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 59, 60 (Sing.) (recognizing that the raising of a
derelict vessel is a form of salvage service).
88. The Tubantia, [1924] P. 78 (allowing an injunction against a second
group of would-be salvors).
89. Robinson, 16 A.L.R. at 663 (Mason,J.).
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Judge Stephen, referring to Fisher v. The Ship "Ocean Gran-
deur, P went even further and asserted that one might be able to
assert a valid salvage claim even in the absence of marine peril.91 In
Fisher, Stephen stated that he would not confine salvage to cases
where a vessel is in danger of threatened destruction or physical in-
jury.9 To Stephen, the fact that a vessel was physically safe would
not defeat a claim for salvage. 93 Stephen also considered mere im-
mobilization and loss of use of a vessel by its owners to be sufficient
to state a valid salvage claim.94 Thus, the opinions of Judges Ste-
phen and Mason in Robinson are a departure from the approach
taken by the court in Simon, though they parallel the decisions of
courts in the United States that have held "peril" exists with historic
shipwrecks.95
Whether an historic shipwreck is in marine peril has most re-
cently been addressed by a Canadian court.96 At issue in the case
was a ship named Atlantic that sank in Lake Erie in 1852 and is cur-
rently located three miles off the tip of Long Point, Ontario.97 The
Crown argued that the Atlantic was not in danger at its present lo-
cation.98 Moreover, the Crown argued that salvaging or raising the
vessel posed more of a threat to the vessel than leaving it undis-
turbed.9 The court, diverging from most courts in the United
90. (1972-73) A.L.R. 948 (Aust. 1972).
91. See Robinson, 16 A.L.R. at 653-54 (Stephen,J.).
92. See Fisher, (1972-73) A.L.R. at 951 (Stephen,J.).
93. See id. at 953.
94. See id. at 954.
95. See cases cited at supra note 75. One interesting note about Robinson is
that Mason was in agreement with the Simon court that if a salvor was motivated to
save a vessel only for personal gain, and not for the benefit of the vessel's owner,
there cannot be a valid salvage claim. See Robinson, 16 A.L.R. at 664 (Mason, J.);
Simon v. Taylor, [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 338, 345 (Sing.). But see supra note 27 (not-
ing that most courts in the United States do not consider a salvor's motives).
96. See Ontario v. Mar-Dive Corp., [1996] 141 D.L.R.4th 577. This case was
recently discussed in detail. See generally Steven R. Yormak, Canadian Treasure: Law
and Lore, 30J. MAR. L. & CoM. 229, 229 (1999).
97. Mar-Dive, 141 D.L.R.4th at 579-81.
98. See id. at 591-92.
99. See id. at 592. The salvors argued that the vessel was in peril of being de-
stroyed by zebra mussels. See id. However, the court was persuaded by the testi-
mony of a marine archaeologist who stated that the exposed portion of the Atlantic
was not large enough for a significant number of zebra mussels to attach them-
selves. See id. If a large number of mussels could not attach themselves to the
ship, then the combined weight of the mussels would not pose a threat of causing
the ship's structural collapse. See id.
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States on the subject, as well as from the opinions of Judges
Stephen and Mason in Robinson, held that the Atlantic was not in
marine peril.1°° The court stated that "salvage efforts can upset the
equilibrium achieved over time in underwater historic sites and ac-
tually create peril by exposing the objects to new environmental
stimuli which can accelerate deterioration. Thus, there is a
checkered history of decisions, both in the United States and inter-
nationally, as to whether historic shipwrecks are in marine peril,
and therefore a proper subject for salvage law. The majority of
courts, however, hold that historic shipwrecks are in need of sal-
vage services because the shipwrecks are in peril.
Commentators tend to agree with the courts that shipwrecks
are in peril. 1 2 One such commentator, Bruce E. Alexander, stated
that "[i]f the elements or the natural processes of decay do not
pose a marine peril to the property, then pirates, thieves, maraud-
ers, or intervening salvors invariably will pose a peril."0 3 Alexander
asserted that marine peril should be presumed as a matter of law.1
04
In order to "protect" archaeological resources, while still keeping
100. See id. at 637-38.
101. Id. at 638. The court stated that the salvors had placed the wreck in peril
due to their unskilled and unscientific recovery of artifacts. See id. Moreover, the
court noted that "[u]nscientific removal of artifacts damages the value of the
wreck." Id.; see also Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
568 F. Supp. 1562, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (noting that unskilled and unscientific
removal of artifacts from shipwrecks actually creates marine peril), affid, 758 F.2d
1511, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985).
102. In a surprisingly brazen comment, without any scientific support, one
commentator made a statement that epitomizes the misconception many in the
public have about shipwreck archaeology: "Detractors of shipwreck salvage note
that wrecks that have rested underwater for years, sometime centuries, hardly face
the type of peril cognizable by salvage law. They are mistaken." Sabrina L.
McLaughlin, Roots, Relics and Recovery: What Went Wrong with the Abandoned Ship-
wreck Act of 1987, 19 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 149, 162 (1995). Those inside the
archaeological community generally do not consider historic shipwrecks to be in
peril. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. It is only in commentary out-
side the archaeological community, especially in law review articles, that the no-
tion of historic shipwrecks being in "marine peril" has unfortunately not been
eliminated.
103. Alexander, supra note 74, at 16 (citation omitted). Amazingly, this same
author admitted that "[treasure salvage ... applies to property that has already
experienced a catastrophe. Stated another way, the peril appears to have passed." Id.
at 14 (emphasis added). But see David R. Owen, Some Legal Troubles with Treasure:
Jurisdiction and Salvage, 16 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 139, 172-76 (1985) [hereinafter
Owen, Some Legal Troubles with Treasure] (arguing that ancient shipwrecks are in
marine peril).
104. See Alexander, supra note 74, at 16.
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them subject to admiralty law, Alexander suggests that courts re-
quire salvors to preserve archaeological data when salvaging a
shipwreck. 05 Under this scheme, if a salvor cannot show that the
salvor or the salvor's crew possesses the necessary archaeological
skills, the salvor could be enjoined from further salvage, and the
amount of skill exhibited could be used in determining the size of
the salvage award.
10 6
There are at least two important problems with the above
scheme. First, to make a salvage claim, a salvor must already have
salvaged something. Before a court could enjoin an unscrupulous
or inexperienced treasure salvor, or deny a salvage claim, some ir-
reversible damage to an archaeological site would have to occur.
Second, in allowing a salvage claim, a court could permit recovery
to salvors with some, but not much, archaeological skill who lost
much archaeological information as they worked. Only when the
amount of the salvage award is being determined would the court
consider the inadequacies of the excavation. However, much irre-
trievable information would have been destroyed. From an ar-
chaeological standpoint, this proposed scheme is patently unac-
ceptable. °7
105. See id. at 17. This is known as an "archaeological duty of care." Alexander
states that "[i]f archaeological, cultural, and historical data are perhaps the more
important features of abandoned shipwrecks, any 'rescue' of an abandoned ship-
wreck ought to include a rescue of this data." Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted). One
of the bills proposed in opposition to the current ASA would have kept historic
shipwrecks within the domain of admiralty law. See Abandoned Historic Shipwreck
Protection Act of 1987, H.R. 2071, 100th Cong. (1987) (unenacted). This bill did
not receive much support, though some in the legal community believed it to be
more faithful to traditional admiralty law than the current ASA. See generally Nancy
M. Hewitt, Note, The Proposed Abandoned Shipwreck Acts of 1987-Archaeological Pres-
ervation and Maritime Law, 12 SUFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 381 (1989) (arguing for
the adoption of H.R. 2071). Prior to the proposal of this alternative bill, admiralty
attorney David P. Horan suggested that admiralty law merely be amended to im-
pose a variation of the archaeological duty of care on treasure salvors. See Aban-
doned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 858 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands,
National Parks and Forests of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 100th Cong.
85-86 (1987) (prepared statement of David P. Horan).
106. See Alexander, supra note 74, at 18. However, a nagging question re-
mains: "How much does a court know about proper archaeological procedures?"
Daniel P. Larsen, Ownership of Historic Shipwrecks in United States Law, 9 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 31, 54 (1994). The answer is probably not enough to make
the type of decisions Alexander proposes. Prott and O'Keefe suggest that judges
generally demonstrate little understanding of archaeological considerations. See 1
PROTr & O'KEEE, supra note 78, at 126.
107. One commentator stated that introduction of the archaeological duty of
care has "actually muddled the maritime law of salvage because it is not based on
2000]
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Nevertheless, a few courts have adopted variations of the ap-
proach proposed by commentators such as Alexander.' °8 In Cobb
Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vesse °9
[hereinafter Cobb Coin I1], the court held that to state a claim for a
salvage award on a shipwreck, which is historically and/or archaeo-
logically significant, the salvor must document to the admiralty
court that he adequately preserved the shipwreck's archaeological
provenience."0 Also, the court in Marex International, Inc. v. Uniden-
tified, Wrecked &Abandoned Vesset" followed the court in Cobb Coin II
and mandated that salvors demonstrate that they used an archaeo-
logical duty of care in salvaging historic shipwrecks before allowing
them to recover under either the law of salvage or finds.112 The ra-
tionale for requiring an archaeological duty of care on salvors was
given by the court in MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentfied, Wrecked &
the guiding premise behind the theory of salvage, which is to return goods to the
stream of commerce." Mayes, supra note 70, at 2039.
108. These few courts require that salvors record the provenience of the arti-
facts they recover. Although this sounds laudable, in practice, however, when
courts speak of recording provenience, they require salvors "merely [to] note the
coordinates of the blow holes they believe the artifacts came from. [But, t] his meth-
odology does not meet the scientific standards necessary for preserving the time cap-
sule information" of shipwrecks. Varmer, supra note 77, at 297.
109. 549 F. Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
110. See id.; see also International Aircraft Recovery, L.L.C. v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Aircraft, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181-82 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (ex-
tending this rule to apply to submerged historic aircraft); Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 208 (S.D.
Fla. 1981) ("There can be no suggestion that federal admiralty procedures sanc-
tion salvaging methods which fail to safeguard items and the invaluable archeo-
logical information associated with the artifacts salved."). Therefore, whether or
not salvors use an archaeological duty of care is not left merely for consideration
in determining the amount of a salvage award. But see Columbus-America Discov-
ery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating
that "the degree to which the salvors have worked to protect the historical and ar-
cheological value of the wreck and items salved" should be taken into account in
determining the salvage award). Unfortunately, the court in Cobb Coin II stated
that salvors need not employ professional archaeologists. See Cobb Coin H 549 F.
Supp. at 559. While not requiring that salvors use professional archaeologists, the
court in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Ves-
sel, 546 F. Supp. 919, 927-28 (S.D. Fla. 1981), noted favorably that Melvin Fisher
had employed archaeologists and historians to record the provenience of artifacts
recovered, preserve and catalogue them, and conserve them so they could be
viewed by the public. For a definition and discussion of provenience, see infra
note 115.
111. 952 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
112. See id. (requiring "provenience data" to be documented by recording and
mapping the location and depth of the vessel and the artifacts in relation to each
other and the vessel).
[Vol. 26:2
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Abandoned Sailing VesseL-" "Archaeological preservation, on-site
photography, and the marking of sites are particularly impor-
tant... as the public interest is compelling in circumstances in
which a treasure ship, constituting a window in time provides a
unique opportunity to create a historical record of an earlier
era."
114
The relative confusion in the courts and in the legal literature
over whether historic shipwrecks are in marine peril, and whether
imposing an archaeological duty of care on salvors is sufficient to
preserve archaeological data, is disheartening. This confusion only
buttresses the notion that many in the archaeological community
feel; namely, the public does not adequately understand what ar-
chaeolog is, or the importance of preserving archaeological re-
sources. Underwater archaeologists have demonstrated time and
113. 631 F. Supp. 308 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
114. See id. at 312 (noting that the parties had not sought to preserve the ar-
chaeological integrity of the shipwreck site). This court did not indicate whether
an archaeological duty of care was required of salvors in order to state a claim for
salvage, but it did state that such would be "a significant element of entitlement to
be considered when exclusive salvage rights are sought." Id. at 310.
115. See Karen D. Vitelli, To Remove the Double Standard: Historic Shipwreck Legis-
lation, 10J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 105, 106 (1983) ("[Pleople still do not understand
that archaeology is not just collecting objects."). In a recent law review article, a
student author proposed a "free market" alternative to treasure salvage. SeeJance
R. Hawkins, Note, Reconsidering the Maritime Law of Finds and Salvage: A Free Market
Alternative, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 75, 92-95 (1996). The author sug-
gested that salvors perform a title search to determine whether an historic ship-
wreck has an owner or is abandoned. See id. at 92. If the wreck is owned, then its
owners should enter into a contract with the salvors to "save" it. See id. at 93. If it
is not owned, then the salvors should go to court and obtain exclusive salvage
rights, and title to the wreck once it is salvaged. See id. Among the problems with
this proposal is its lack of concern for the historical and archaeological data ship-
wrecks contain. There was a time when free enterprise existed in the business of
treasure hunting. Congress enacted the ASA to curtail that free enterprise. From
an archaeological standpoint, this free market proposal harkens back to the pre-
ASA days. That such an article was written relatively recently demonstrates that
the legal community still does not understand the importance of archaeology. In
an older but still often cited note, a student writer stated that laws should not dis-
courage treasure salvors because they recover artifacts for the public to enjoy. See
Howard H. Shore, Note, Marine Archaeology and International Law: Background and
Some Suggestions, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 668, 690-91 (1972). This suggestion demon-
strates a common misunderstanding the public has about archaeology, i.e., that
archaeologists are only concerned with artifacts. Archaeologists do not focus on
the mere recovery of artifacts. Rather, they are concerned with observing and re-
cording the temporal and spatial relationships of individual artifacts and features,
and between artifacts and features, discovered at a site. When archaeologists care-
fully record the horizontal and vertical location of an artifact, they are giving it a
.provenience." Provenience is the "[t ] hree-dimensional location of an artifact or
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time again that historic shipwrecks are not in marine peril.1 6 For
example, James M. Parrent correctly stated:
Objects that come to rest on the sea floor initially start to
deteriorate while at the same time becoming covered with
concretions consisting of corrosion products and marine
organisms. Eventually the concretion forms a protective
barrier greatly reducing further deterioration. After the
artifacts have acclimated to their underwater environment
they are impervious to currents, tides and storms. Any
wooden sailing vessel that has lain on the sea bed for a few
hundred years has long since reached a stage of equilib-
rium with its environment and it has the potential to re-
main preserved for hundreds if not thousands of
117
years ....
Therefore, courts should not hold submerged shipwrecks to be
feature in an excavation unit." BARBARA A. PuRDY, HOW TO DO ARCHAEOLOGY THE
RIGHT WAY 183 (1996). In addition to provenience, archaeologists are also con-
cerned with recording "context." Context is the relationship in time and space of
all the artifacts and features discovered at a site to each other. See BRIAN M. FAGAN,
ARCHAEOLOGY: A BRIEF INTRODUcTION 25 (5th ed. 1994). Archaeologists are con-
cerned with provenience and context because they require a precise knowledge of
associations and distributions of artifacts and features in their horizontal and ver-
tical positions at a site to create an accurate reconstruction of the past. See KNUT
R. FLADMARK, A GUIDE TO BASIC ARCHAEOLOGICAL FIELD PROCEDURES 83-91 (1978)
(discussing proper excavation procedures and explaining their significance).
116. During underwater archaeology's infancy, many terrestrial archaeologists
believed that storms, wave action, and other natural forces would have disturbed
whatever contextual data may once have existed at submerged archaeological sites.
See Wilburn A. Cockrell, The Trouble with Treasure-A Preservationist View of the Con-
troversy, 45 AM. ANTIQUrIY 333, 338 (1980). However, during the past few decades
research has indicated that submerged archaeological sites are not necessarily de-
stroyed or unwilling to yield their stories.
117. James M. Parrent, Treasure Hunters in the Caribbean: The Current Crisis, in
UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY CONFERENCE 32, 35 (James P. Delgado ed., 1988); accord IVOR N.
HUME, HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY 190 (3d prtg. 1974) ("Each wreck may be a
miniature Pompeii and deserves to be treated accordingly."); Daniel J. Lenihan,
Rethinking Shipwreck Archaeology: A History of Ideas and Considerations for New Direc-
tions, in SHIPWRECK ANTHROPOLOGY 37, 40 (Richard A. Gould ed., 1983) (stating
that after a short period of time "the material remains [of a shipwreck] stabilize
within the new environment."). The rate of deterioration of a shipwreck depends
upon many factors, such as the presence of microorganisms, or excessive heat or
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in marine peril.""8 Rather, treasure salvors and looters put sites into
peril when they disrupt the equilibrium that sites have reached with
their environment." 9 This type of "retrieval peril" is not the type of
peril contemplated by traditional salvage law. 20  Once historic
shipwrecks have reached an equilibrium with their environments,
they are not in peril and treasure salvors should not be allowed to
salvage them for commercial gain.
Moreover, most archaeologists believe that allowing salvors to
excavate sites, even with an "archaeological duty of care" imposed
upon them, is not sufficient. One scholar wrote:
[I] t is not self-evident to the public, and clearly not to the
state and federal legislative bodies, that only archaeolo-
gists are trained to carry out professional excavations; to
keep documentation that can be examined and verified by
others; to study the materials and the context so that we
might all learn what they can tell us about earlier societies;
to share that knowledge with other scholars and the pub-
lic; and to preserve the relics of the past for intelligent
118. Once a ship has sunk, it is quickly removed from any peril the environ-
ment could pose. "[T]he evolution of the boat towards its final form, before it is
buried by currents and swells, marine life and sedimentation, is rather rapid, some
ten years... depending on the type of wood it is built of and the marine condi-
tions." Frrdrric Dumas, Ancient Wrecks, in UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY: A NASCENT
DISCIPLINE 27, 30 (1972). Most scholars and a few legal commentators agree that
historic shipwrecks are not in marine peril. See, e.g.,J. Barto Arnold III, U.S. Federal
Legal Historic Shipwreck Legislation: Development and Status, 16 INT'L J. NAUTICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERWATER EXPLORATION 3, 4 (1987); Sjur Braekhus, Salvage of
Wrecks and Wreckage: Legal Issues Arising from the Runde Find, 20 SCANDINAVIAN STUD.
L. 37, 57 (1976); Antony Firth, Archaeology Underwater in France, 7 INT'L J.
ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 57, 58 (1992); Larsen, supra note 106, at 37; L. Van
Meurs, Legal Aspects of Marine Archaeological Research, [1986] ACrAJURIDICA 83, 102;
Varmer, supra note 76, at 280-81.
119. See Parrent, supra note 117, at 35. While it is the duty of an attorney to
zealously advocate the interests of his client, treasure salvage attorneys face several
ethical dilemmas. One of these is candor to the tribunal. See Peter E. Hess, The
Trouble with Treasure: Ethical Dilemmas for the Salvage Attorney, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com.
253, 254-56 (1999). With voluminous data that unprofessional retrieval of artifacts
actually places the items in peril, it would seem unethical for attorneys to argue
that anything less than proper, scientific, legal, and professional archaeological
expeditions, with proper artifact conservation, can actually remove artifacts from
any "peril" they may encounter as they rest safely on the ocean floor.
120. See Cynthia Furrer Newton, Note, Finders Keepers? The Titanic and the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 159, 179 (1986)
(coining the phrase "retrieval peril"). Retrieval peril is created when salvors re-
move submerged archaeological resources from their state of equilibrium in the
sea, and do not adequately conserve them. See id.
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presentation to the public. The archaeologist acts, as we
must emphasize, rv the public good; the salvor, for himself
and his investors.
This same scholar went on to say that "treasure salvors, out for
whatever profit they can glean from the skeleton of an ancient
shipwreck, are no more the peers of archaeologists than tomb rob-
,,122bers .... Thus, most archaeologists think that historic ship-
wrecks are not in marine peril, and that merely imposing an ar-
chaeological duty on salvors is insufficient to protect the
archaeological data that shipwrecks contain.
Even if courts hold fast to the position that historic shipwrecks
are in marine peril, there are other methods within traditional ad-
miralty law to deter treasure salvors.12 Archaeologists should first
argue that any peril that exists with historic shipwrecks is de mini-
121. James R. Wiseman, Archaeology Today: From the Classroom to the Field and
Elsewhere, 93 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 437, 443 (1989). But seeJ. Barto Arnold, III, Un-
derwater Cultural Resources and the Antiquities Market, 5 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 232,
232 (1978) ("The aim is not to prohibit private individuals from working on the
sites, but to assure that whatever work is done will be carried out under the most
current scientific archaeological controls and methodology."). It should be noted
that many treasure salvors claim to "do" archaeology because they excavate sites
and study the artifacts retrieved for a few years before selling them. However, as
Philippe Diol6 correctly stated, "[D]igging is not archaeology. It is merely a means
of discovery; one aspect and one aspect only, of the work at hand. It can never be
an end in itself. The fact is that digging presents us with more problems than it
solves." PHILIPPE DIoLi-, 4000 YEARS UNDER THE SEA 15 (Gerard Hopkins trans.,
1954). Archaeologists only dig as much as they have to, preserving much of a site
for the future. See Clemency Chase Coggins, A Licit International Traffic in Ancient
Art: Let There Be Light!, 4 INT'LJ. CULTURAL PROP. 61, 65 (1995). When archaeolo-
gists dig, they do so for a good reason: to answer specific research questions. See
id. "Finding treasure is not a good reason." Id. Also, for every month in the field,
it takes approximately two years to adequately conserve and record the artifacts
recovered and prepare publishable reports. See COLIN RENFREW & PAUL BAHN,
ARCHAEOLOGY: THEORIES, METHODS & PRACTICE 536 (2d ed. 1996). It may take ar-
chaeologists over 10 years to excavate a site, study the artifacts, and publish their
findings. See Sue Williams, Underwater Heritage, A Treasure Trove to Protect, UNESCO
SOURCES, Feb. 1997, at 7 (statement of M. Paulo Montero). When considered in
this light, the "few years" treasure salvors claim to spend studying artifacts before
selling them appears for what it is: inadequate.
122. Wiseman, supra note 121, at 442; see Douglas L. McWilliams, Salvage of An-
cdent Treasure Ships, 1986 LLOYD'S MAP. & COM. L.Q. 16, 20 (1986) ("[R]ecovery
operations by treasure salvors... may be perceived as the 'looting and pillaging'
of sites which contain items of significant archaeological and historic value.").
123. The following suggestions are based on those made byJ. Barto Arnold III
in a rarely cited article. SeeJ. Barto Arnold III, Some Thoughts on Salvage Law and
Historic Preservation, 7 INT'L J. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERWATER
EXPLORATION 173, 176 (1978) [hereinafter Arnold, Some Thoughts on Salvage Law].
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mus, and therefore a salvage award should either be reduced or
denied altogether.14 Instead of rescuing shipwrecks from peril, sal-
vors actually place shipwrecks in peril if the salvors are not properly
trained or do not employ sound archaeological principles and
techniques. However, at least one court was of the opinion that
"salvors who seek to preserve and enhance the historical value of
ancient shipwrecks should be justly rewarded."
1 5
Second, archaeologists should argue that treasure salvors do
not possess, and have not exhibited, the necessary "skill" to receive
a salvage award. 126  By recovering artifacts without properly re-
cording their provenience and context, treasure salvors have de
facto looted the site. The traditional penalty for looting or plunder-
ing salvaged property has been to significantly diminish or deny a
salvage award. 27 At least one judge has refused to accept the
proposition of totally denying incompetent treasure salvors a sal-
vage award, insisting that "[t]he fact that plaintiff failed to employ
proper archeological techniques in removing artifacts from the
shipwreck may reduce the amount of any salvage award, but should
not altogether deprive plaintiff of such an award."
2 8
If a court determines to give a salvage award to treasure sal-
vors, the court could still significantly reduce the award in another
way. This can be effectuated by holding that artifacts recovered
without adequate contextual information are less valuable than ar-
tifacts with such information, or an award could be denied alto-
gether by holding that artifacts without such information are value-
less. 129 AsJ. Barto Arnold III stated, "[w] hen the incalculable loss of
historical, social, and anthropological data resulting from the re-
moval of artifacts from a shipwreck site without proper archaeo-
logical controls is thrown into the balance the matter of value
could.., be interpreted in a negative sense in determining the sal-
124. This suggestion is based on the sixth factor enumerated in Blackwall. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
125. Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d
450, 468 (4th Cir. 1992).
126. This suggestion is based on the second factor enumerated in Blackwall.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
127. See Martin J. Norris, Misconduct of Salvors, 18 BROOK. L. REv. 247, 249-50
(1952).
128. Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d
1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (Kravitch, CJ., specially concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
129. This suggestion is based on the fifth factor enumerated in Blackwall. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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vage award.""0
If courts decide not to apply salvage law, they may still attempt
to apply the law of finds. The law of finds is even more inappropri-
ate for the preservation of historic shipwrecks than salvage law.
With salvage law, there is at least the possibility for courts to com-
mand salvors to use an archaeological duty of care, and courts are
able to diminish or deny salvage awards when salvors excavate
shipwrecks in a nonprofessional manner. With the law of finds,
however, once the court has awarded title of the res to the salvors,
the property may be disposed of as the salvors see fit. There is ab-
solutely no protection given to historic shipwrecks under the law of
finds and it should not, from a policy perspective, ever play a part
in the disposition of historic shipwrecks.
As seen in the foregoing discussion, courts and commentators
have struggled in an attempt to apply the laws of salvage and finds
to historic shipwrecks. The courts and the majority of commenta-
tors are, however, starting from the wrong premise. 132 In deciding
130. Arnold, Some Thoughts on Salvage Law, supra note 123, at 176.
131. One commentator, who defended the right of treasure hunters to salvage
historic shipwrecks, agrees that the law of finds should not govern the disposition
of historic shipwrecks. He stated that the "endorsement and popular use of the
principle of finds [by the courts] ... threatens the delicate balance of public pol-
icy considerations that have been the historic justifications for salvage law." Rob-
ert A. Koenig, Property Rights in Recovered Sea Treasure: The Salvor's Perspective, 3
N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271, 298 (1982).
132. A recent case exemplifies the current tension between attempts to en-
courage historical and archaeological data preservation and the constraints im-
posed by traditional admiralty law. See R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Aban-
doned Vessel, 9 F. Supp. 2d 624 (E.D. Va. 1998), affd and revd in part sub nom.
R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 74
(1999). This case concerns the efforts of the salvor in possession (RMST) of the
R.M.S. Titanic to prohibit another organization, Deep Ocean Expeditions, from
providing the public with "tours" of the site for a fee. See id. at 628-29. The district
court stated that RMST conducted meticulous salvage operations and tours could
potentially injure the wreck and/or interfere with the salvage. See id. at 635-37.
Noting RMST's scientific operation, careful conservation of recovered ar-
tifacts, and the fact that RMST did not plan to sell any artifacts other than coal, see
id. at 628, the court attempted to protect the R.M.S. Titanic wreck site and its arti-
facts, in addition to R.M.S. Titanic's economic interests, under the guise of tradi-
tional admiralty law. See id. at 635-37. All the artifacts recovered from the R.M.S.
Titanic will eventually be permanently housed in a museum in the United States
and RMST only makes money from museum ticket sales, and licenses to third par-
ties of Titanic photographs, videos, artifacts replicas, apparel, etc. See id. at 628.
Normally, salvors sell what they recover to pay for their treasure salvage opera-
tions. See Anne Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck Bill: Protecting Our Threatened
Cultural Heritage, ARcHAEOLOGY,July-Aug. 1987, at 50; see also Sue Williams, Marx is
the Name, Treasure's the Game, UNESCO Sources, Feb. 1997, at 9 (statement of
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Robert Marx, noting that it can cost over #30,000 per day to salvage an historic
shipwreck). The district court understood that keeping artifacts together in a mu-
seum is in accordance with the international trend to protect cultural property, see
RM.S. Titanic, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d at 639-40, and determined that traditional sal-
vage rights needed to be expanded to protect RMST and other salvors who scien-
tifically conserve and preserve the historic data they recover from shipwrecks. See
id. at 636. This court concluded that since photographs could be marketed like
artifacts recovered from a site, the rights to photograph and videotape the R.M.S.
Titanic belonged to the salvor in possession, RMST. See id. at 640. Moreover, the
court enjoined Deep Ocean Expeditions from entering the wreck site for the pur-
pose of conducting any search, survey, salvage or recovering photographs, videos
or images of the wreck. See id. Unfortunately for RMST, salvage law has yet to
recognize such a novel right. The court of appeals, 171 F.3d 943, 969-71 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 74 (1999), applied traditional salvage law correctly
and effectively took away whatever protection for the site and its artifacts the dis-
trict court may have created.
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that to receive a
salvage award salvors must provide a useful service and be successful. See id. at 969-
70; see also supra notes 29-46 and accompanying text (detailing the requirements
necessary to prove before a court will grant a salvage award). Stating that no other
court has expanded salvor's rights to include an exclusive right to photograph and
videotape a wreck site, see RM.S. Titanic, Inc., 171 F.3d at 969, the court pro-
claimed that "[t]he law does not include the notion that the salvor can use the
property being salvaged for a commercial use [i.e., licensing photographs and vid-
eos] to compensate the salvor when the property saved might have inadequate
value." Id. at 970. Moreover, the court said that if salvors did receive an exclusive
right to videotape and photograph a wreck site they "would be less inclined to save
property because they might be able to obtain more compensation by leaving the
property in place and selling photographic images or charging the public admis-
sion to go view it." Id.
The court of appeals is undoubtedly correct in its determination that un-
der salvage law salvors do not have an interest in objects until they actually have
been salvaged. As mentioned above, see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text,
one must prove success before a salvage award is granted. Merely taking pictures
or videotaping artifacts lying on the sea floor does not bring the goods before the
court or return them to the stream of commerce. Thus, under a strict admiralty
approach, nothing has been "saved." Since an award comes from selling the arti-
facts saved, or from the artifacts themselves in some instances, see supra note 47,
there is nothing from which to base a salvage award if the only thing accomplished
is the taking of pictures or videos.
However, from a preservation standpoint, this case and the rule of law it
provides is unfortunate and was avoidable. Shortly after the discovery of the
R.M.S. Titanic, Congress enacted the R.M.S Titanic Maritime Memorial Act of
1986. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 450rr to 450rr-6 (1994). This Act declared the R.M.S. Ti-
tanic to be a memorial in honor of those who perished when it sank and sought to
encourage the creation of an international treaty respecting the wreck. See id. §
450rr(b). Such a treaty could have prevented all but the most scientific and unin-
trusive exploration of the site and disallowed intermeddling commercial tours.
Sadly, no such treaty has come into fruition.
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 21,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/112, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS], the R.M.S. Titanic is located in the "Area," which is that part of the sea
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that either the law of salvage or finds applies, one must first accept
the faulty premise that historic shipwrecks are still maritime prop-
erty within the meaning of admiralty law. This is absurd. At some
point a shipwreck stops being the remains of a commercial vessel,
and becomes an archaeological site.13  The starting question
should not be whether the law of salvage or the law of finds applies
to an historic shipwreck, but whether the shipwreck is still to be
considered a ship, or whether it is more properly classified as an134
archaeological site. A few courts in other countries have ac-
beyond the jurisdiction of any coastal nation. Resources found in the Area are de-
clared to be the "common heritage of mankind." Id. at 1293. In addition, all ob-
jects of an archaeological or historical nature that are found in the Area are to be
"preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole .... " Id. at 1295.
The question naturally arises under UNCLOS as to what nation is responsible for
the preservation and disposition of archaeological objects found in the Area, such
as those from R.M.S. Titanic. It is possible that each state would have the respon-
sibility to preserve the objects. "But even assuming that were the case, it is still not
clear how objects should be preserved. Would housing finds in public museums
be sufficient, or would such artifacts need to be sent on loan to other States?" Ar-
end, supra note 70, at 798. It appears that the UNCLOS does not prohibit salvage
of historically significant shipwrecks so long as the above ambiguous language cur-
rently is satisfied.
There is no international law adequately protecting important shipwrecks
such as the R.M.S. Titanic, and our domestic courts struggle to solve the problem
by forcing such archaeological sites into the constraints of admiralty law. What is
desperately needed is an international treaty that will take important archaeologi-
cal and historic sites out of admiralty law and place them under a sui generis law
designed for their protection. See supra note 72 (discussing UNESCO's Draft Con-
vention). However, it may be decades before such a treaty comes into existence.
Even if a treaty is promulgated, it is doubtful whether the Senate will give the ad-
vice and consent necessary for its ratification. The Senate still has not done so for
the UNCLOS.
133. One example is sufficient to demonstrate that all things, including ship-
wrecks, at some time become archaeological sites. Two thousand years ago, Ro-
mans conducted business and lived in Pompeii. See OXFORD COMPANION TO
CLASSICAL LrrERATuRE 454 (M.C. Howatson ed., 1989). This city was abandoned
when Vesuvius erupted and the city was covered with volcanic ash. See id. Over the
centuries, the city was forgotten, and it was transformed into an archaeological
site. See id. When the city was excavated, the houses were not cleared out and put
up for sale. The markets were not reopened for business. The reason is that, over
the centuries, a once vibrant town passed from the world of commerce and living
into an archaeological site. In the same way, shipwrecks may, by the passage of
time, cease to be commercial vessels, and become archaeological sites. See S. REP.
No. 100-241, at 6 (1987) (stating that shipwrecks are no longer viewed only as lost
commercial resources, but as archaeological and recreational resources as well).
134. Stated slightly differently, the question is: "When does a shipwreck be-
come an archaeological site?" Any date after which one says that a shipwreck has
become an archaeological site is inherently arbitrary. During the 1970s, many ar-
chaeologists rejected the premise that archaeological data must be "ancient." See
[Vol. 26:2
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cepted the premise that shipwrecks can be archaeological sites, not
subject to traditional admiralty principles.15  By excluding ship-
William L. Rathje, Modern Material Culture Studies, in 2 ADVANCES IN
ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD AND THEORY 1, 2 (Michael B. Schiffer ed., 1979); see also
Robert F. Marx, What is Underwater Archaeology? Part 1, SKIN DIVER, Mar. 1975, at 54,
56 ("[A]ny find that sheds light on man's past, how he lived, worked, traveled and
how and what he constructed will have some archaeological significance, regard-
less of age."). Since 1971, Professor Rathje has been engaged in the Garbage Pro-
ject, which conducts archaeological studies in modem landfills. For an extensive
discussion of the Garbage Project, see generally W.L. Rathje et al., The Archaeology
of Contemporary Landfills, 57 AM. ANTIQUITY 437 (1992); William L. Rathje, Once and
Future Landfills, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, May 1991, at 116; William Rathje, Why We
Throw Food Away, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1986, at 14; William L. Rathje, The Gar-
bage Project, 27 ARCHAEOLOGY 236 (1974). To Rathje and other scholars, modem
garbage constitutes an archaeological resource that can inform us about ourselves
and our recent predecessors. One important note arising from the Garbage Pro-
ject is Rathje's observation that "Americans are wasteful, but to some degree we
have been conditioned to think of ourselves as more wasteful than we truly are -
and certainly more wasteful than we used to be." William L. Rathje, Rubbish!,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1989, at 99, 101. Thus, even modem goods may be con-
sidered archaeological data, and modem structures archaeological sites. Choos-
ing a date after which something is said to become an archaeological site must,
therefore, be one based on policy considerations. This determination is best
suited for the legislature. However, 100 years, see Unidroit Convention, supra note 6,
at 11 (stating in the annex, subsection (e), that antiquities more than 100 years
old are cultural objects), or 50 years, see 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (1998) (stating in subsec-
tion (g) under "Criteria Considerations" that a site must generally be more than
fifty years old to be considered significant under the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act), are frequently used dates in considering whether something is to be
considered an archaeological site, historically significant, and subject to historic
preservation law.
135. In King & Chapman v. The Owners & All Persons Claiming an Interest in "La
Lavia," 'Juliana" and "Santa Maria de la Vision," 1986 No. 11076, 11077, 11078 P
(Transcript) (Ir. H. Ct. 1994) (LEXIS, Comcas Library, Irecas File), appeal allowed
sub nom. In re the Sailing Vessels "La Lavia, " Juliana" and "Santa Maria de la Vision".
Alan King & Harry Chapman v. Owners & All Person Claiming an Interest in the Said
Sailing Vessels, [1996] 1 I.L.R.M. 194 (Ir. S.C.), the High Court of Ireland stated
that "insofar as it is practicable to do so, principles of law relating to archaeologi-
cal finds on land should apply also to similar discoveries on or under the sea
bed[,]" and held that historic shipwrecks may be regarded as "having passed from
the commercial realm of maritime salvage law into the domain of archaeological
law." Also, in New Zealand, a lower court accepted the definition of a shipwreck as
an archaeological site. SeeJ.R. McKinlay & G.J. Henderson, The Protection of Historic
Shipwrecks: A New Zealand Case Study, ARCHAEOLOGY, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 48, 50. "At
one time this activity [i.e., treasure hunting] may have been thought of as a
worthwhile endeavor by entrepreneurs, but today there is greater recognition of
the need in many cases for properly conducted archaeological survey and excava-
tion." Sarah Dromgoole & Nicholas Gaskell, Who Has a Right to Historic Wrecks and
Wreckage, 2 INT'LJ. CULTURAL PROP. 217, 220 (1993). Chinese legislation has rec-
ognized that historic shipwrecks should not be subject to traditional admiralty law
and treats them as archaeological resources. See Hongye Zhao, Recent Developments
20001
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wrecks of a certain age, such as those over one hundred years old,
from admiralty law, ordinary commercial salvors should not be sig-
nificantly restrained."6
It is time for the legal community to realize that historic ship-
wrecks should not be disposed of under traditional admiralty prin-
ciples, which were established for purposes other than the protec-
tion of archaeological information.7 As the Indiana Supreme
Court stated, although in a different context, "[It]he information in
these sites expands our knowledge of human history.., and thus
enriches us as a state, nation and as human beings. The general
welfare of the public is greatly enhanced by such knowledge."
18
We should not allow treasure salvors to destroy the information
that historic shipwrecks hold for us while they search for commer-
cial gain. The time has come to realize that historic shipwrecks are
archaeological sites. Information recovered from these sites will
enrich us all, as we learn about our common cultural heritage.
IV. CONCLUSION
"[A] ny deliberate destruction of the historical value of an an-
tiquity is... a crime against humanity."13 This article has pro-
in the Legal Protection of Historic Shipwrecks in China, 23 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 305,
321 (1992). Compare Adam Lawrence, State Antiquity Laws and Admiralty Salvage:
Protecting Our Cultural Resources, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 291, 333 n.189 (1977)
("[M]arine antiquities recovery is too far removed from traditional maritime and
salvage pursuits .... ."), with Owen, Some Legal Troubles with Treasure, supra note 103,
at 175 ("[I] t is difficult to argue that a competent, honorable salvor does not de-
serve to avail himself of the law or [sic] marine salvage just because of the antiquity
of the shipwreck." (citation omitted)).
136. See Patrick J. O'Keefe, The Law and Nautical Archaeology: An International
Survey, in 2 MARINE ARCHAEOLOGY: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 455, 460 (G. Kuppu-
ram & K. Kumudamani eds., 1996).
137. One commentator even suggested that "[e]ntrepreneurial motives for
recovery and sale of artifacts from shipwrecks can reasonably be regarded as con-
trary to the fundamental objectives of salvage." McWilliams, supra note 122, at 19-
20. Unfortunately, many courts in the United States have stated that one's motives
for engaging in salvage are irrelevant. See supra note 27. Nevertheless, the entre-
preneurial motives of treasure salvors, that is, to maximize profits and keep their
discoveries, is not supported by traditional admiralty law and "does not further the
notion of preservation of historical or archaeological value. For this reason, the
law of shipwrecks is no longer applicable to historic wrecks." Larsen, supra note
106, at 55.
138. Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542
N.E.2d 1000, 1005 (Ind. 1989).
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pounded arguments to disallow treasure salvors from salvaging
submerged archaeological resources. However, merely enacting
new domestic and international laws to take such resources out of
admiralty law may not be sufficient. As one scholar has correctly
noted, "legal solutions are costly, slow, and ineffective. .. . [A]
change in people's attitudes is essential." 140 People must under-
stand that treasure salvors are not heroes for having discovered
long lost artifacts. They should not be admired for their apparent
wealth. 4' Treasure salvors rip archaeological resources from their
context, thereby making them relatively useless for scientific
study. 142 Moreover, after professional archaeological excavations,
collections of artifacts are typically not sold. 14  By not selling arti-
140. Arthur Miller, Archaeological Looting: A New Approach to the Problem,
EXPEDITION, Spring 1982, at 35, 40; accord D.K. Abbass, A Marine Archaeologist Looks
at Treasure Salvage, 30J. MAR. L. & CoM. 261, 267 (1999) (stating that "legislation is
useless in the absence of effective public support."). Lyndel V. Prott, in International
Penal Aspects of Cultural Protection Law, 7 CRIM. L.J. 207, 215 (1983), noted that edu-
cation has been used in many countries, in addition to legislation, in an effort to
protect underwater archaeological resources. Some countries, such as China, pun-
ish severely those who violate their cultural property statutes. See, e.g., China Exe-
cutes 16 for Buddha Theft, Grave Robbing, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, July 1, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Archnews File (executing people for stealing cul-
tural property); Shanxi Province Executes 15 People for Stealing Relics, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, Sept. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Archnews File (same).
Such harsh penalties, have not stopped the looting of China's cultural heritage.
There is still a growing market in both authentic and counterfeit artifacts. SeeJ.
DAVID MURPHY, PLUNDER AND PRESERVATION: CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND
PRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 52-67 (1995) (discussing tomb-
robbing, smuggling, and thefts from museums); Shamina Qureshi, Chinese Repro-
ductions Flourish as Supply of Antiquities Dwindles, UPI, Oct. 3, 1983, available in
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (reporting the increase in counterfeit artifacts).
Thus, merely enacting legislation to protect archaeological resources, even those
providing harsh penalties, may not be sufficient. A change in people's attitudes
concerning the importance of archaeological resources is also needed.
141. This comment is furthered by a recent statement by David C. Frederick,
Book Review, 30J. MAR. L. & CoM. 355, 356 (1999) (reviewing GARY KINDER, SHIP
OF GOLD IN THE DEEP BLUE SEA: THE HISTORY AND DISCOVERY OF AMERICA'S RICHEST
SHIPWRECK (1998)): "[T]here is... something perverse about deifying treasure sal-
vors whose overriding purpose is not the advancement of human knowledge but the
pursuit of private riches."
142. See, e.g., Peter Throckmorton, The World's Worst Investment: The Economics of
Treasure Hunting with Real Life Comparisons, in UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY CONFERENCE 6, 8
(Toni L. Carrell ed., 1990) ("Today's salvors are no more aware of the cultural ma-
terial they destroy than the peasant farmers who rob tombs for a living in Sicily or
Columbia.").
143. One of the basic tenets of archaeological ethics is that "artifacts recovered
from archaeological sites should remain in the public domain rather than be sold
2000]
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facts, but by keeping them together as a discrete collection, scien-
tists are able to glean further information from the artifacts as new
technologies become available.' 44 By taking submerged archaeo-
logical resources out of admiralty law, enacting new, comprehen-
sive, domestic and international laws, and by educating the public
of the important nature these resources play in our inteTretation
of the past, we may be able to save the past for our future. Let us
not underestimate the importance of the past in our present or in
the future. In carelessly destrouing the past we destroy part of our
present and part of the future." 46
and scattered all over the world in private collections." J. Barto Arnold III, Under-
water Cultural Resources and the Antiquities Market, 5J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 232, 232
(1978). But see DavidJ. Bederman, Historic Salvage and the Law of the Sea, 30 U. Mi-
ami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 99, 129 (1998) ("It would be extravagant to suggest no item
of value recovered from a wreck should be sold").
144. See George F. Bass, After the Diving is Over, in UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SOCIETY FOR HIsTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY CONFERENCE 10, 10-
11 (Toni L. Carrell ed., 1990). No one interpretation of a site is necessarily cor-
rect. Scientists need the opportunity to check and recheck the data and conclu-
sions produced by other scholars. By selling the artifacts discovered at a site,
scholars are precluded from later studying the artifacts as new technologies be-
come available. Moreover, sites cannot be studied in isolation. Artifacts and data
recovered at one site must be compared with information retrieved at other sites.
It is only through this type of comparative study that an accurate picture of the
past can be obtained. By selling artifacts, instead of keeping them together in a
museum, such study is impossible. See ARCHAEOLOGY UNDERWATER: THE NAS
GUIDE TO PRINCIPLES & PRACICE 22 (Martin Dean et al. eds., 1992). Additionally,
"[fiuture generations are likely to have a better understanding and superior equip-
ment to uncover the stories of history and culture which may be hidden from even
the trained eye of present-day archaeologists," and by allowing the commercial sal-
vage of shipwrecks, we take the opportunity away from future scientists to uncover
more information than can be discovered at the present time. See Varmer, supra
note 77, at 287.
145. Some may claim that by totally proscribing treasure salvage a black market
in looted and/or counterfeit artifacts will emerge. See, e.g., Paul J. Tzimoulis,
Shipwrecks Lost, SKIN DivER, Jan. 1988, at 8 (asserting that "unjust" laws such as the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act will lead divers to secretly loot shipwrecks). See generally
Thomg Kulka, The Artistic & Aesthetic Status of Forgeries, LEONARDO, Spring 1982, at
115 (discussing why counterfeits are not as important as authentic relics); Thom;9
Kulka, The Artistic & Aesthetic Value of Art, 21 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 336 (1981)
(same). However, this assertion is belied by the fact that there already exists a
black market in the United States for looted and counterfeit antiquities, although
it is generally legal to excavate on one's private property and sell the discoveries.
See generally O'KEEFE, supra note 139, at 467-68 (discussing the black market in Na-
tive American artifacts); Bruce Frankel & Tim Roche, Good as Gold?, PEOPLE,June
15, 1998, at 89 (asserting that treasure salvor Melvin Fisher may have been selling
counterfeit gold coins).
146. Giesecke, Historic Shipwreck Resources, supra note 9, at 130.
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